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In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
UNITED INDUSTRIAL WORKERS OF
NORTH AMERICA WELFARE PLAN

CONSENT AWARD

-and-

BABYLAND NURSERY, INC.

The above-named parties selected the Undersigned as the
Arbitrator to decide a dispute between them regarding Babyland's
indebtness to the United

Industrial Workers of North America

Welfare Plan ("Plan").
The parties have reached a settlement of the dispute
which at their mutual request I make as my Award, as follows:
This

arbitration

contributions
Inc.,

concerns

payable by

delinquent

Babyland

("Company") to the United

Workers

of

("Plan").

North
The

America

Company

Nursery,

Industrial

Welfare

is

party

Plan
to

a

collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") with
the

United

Industrial,

Transportation,

Professional

Workers of North America.

Service,

and Government

Pursuant to that

CBA the Company became a party and subscriber
to the Trust Agreement establishing the Plan
listed above.

The Company has agreed to remit

monthly contributions to the Plan on behalf of

its

employees,

to

welfare benefits.
1, 1994

provide

for health

and

During the period from July

throuQ1.. June 30, 1995 the

monthly

contribution rate was $333.50 per employee.
Each employee agreed to contribute $15.00 per
month towards this amount.
In order to avoid the necessity of litigation
procedures, the CBA and trust agreement permit
the arbitration of any question concerning the
payment

of monies to the

Plan.

The CBA

further provides that the Plan is authorized
to directly pursue

all matters related to

payments to the Plans, and grants authority to
the Plan to determine whether to pursue such
matters in New Jersey or Maryland.

In this

instance, the Plan has elected to pursue the
delinquency in the state of New Jersey.

For

the purposes of this proceeding, the Company
and

the

Plan

have

stipulated

that

all

preliminary steps to submitting the matter to
arbitration have been completed.
The Company and the Plan are in agreement that
other

than

represents

a payment
the

of

employees'

$4,830.00,

which

co-payment,

the

Company has not remitted contributions owed to
the Plan for the months of March, April, May

and June

1995.

Based upon the number of

bargaining unit employees during those months,
the Company and the Plan have stipulated that
the Company owes $102,557.00 to the Plan for
this period.

The Company and the Plan have

agreed

the

Company

owed

in accordance with

that

contributions

will

pay

the
the

following schedule:
Payment

One

-

$40,000.00

to

be

received by the Plan on September
15, 1995;
Payment

Two

-

$32,000.00

to

be

received by the Plan on October 15,
1995;
Payment Three

- $30,557.00

to be

received by the Plan on November 15,
1995.
The collective bargaining agreement provides
that in an arbitration proceeding concerning
payment to the Plans, the arbitrator
have

the

authority

contributions,

to

award

interest

the

thereon,

shall
unpaid
and

liquidated damages in an amount equal to the
greater

of

interest

on

the

unpaid

contributions or liquidated damages of twenty
per cent (20%) of the amount owed.

Provided

that

the

Company

makes

the

payments

as

indicated above, the parties have agreed that
interest

and

payable.

liquidated

However

in

damages

are

not

event

that

the

the

Company defaults in its obligations to repay,
the

Plan

is

entitled

to

interest

and

liquidated damages on the entire delinquent
amount.

The parties have stipulated that the

Company is in default if payments one and two
are twenty (20) days late, or if payment three
is

one

(1) day

late.

Interest

shall

be

computed at the rate of eight per cent (8% )
per annum.

Interest

shall accrue from the

last day of the month in which a particular
contribution

payment

was

first

due

until

payment in full is made.
The

parties

agree

that the

Plan

may

seek

enforcement of this arbitration award within
six months of the date of delivery
award.

of this

In the event of a default, the Plan

will seek enforcement of the full amount of
the award, including interest and liquidated
damages.

The parties also agree that Babyland

will remain current in its contributions
the Plan.

to

AWARD
The

Company

delinquent

is

indebted

contributions

to

the

in the

Plan

for

amount

of

$102,557.00, to be repaid in accordance with
the schedule outlined above.

In the event

that the Company defaults on its repayment
schedule, the Plan is entitled to the full
amount of contributions

owed, plus

interest

and liquidated damages as calculated above, as
well

as

attorneys

fees

and

costs

of

enforcement.

Eric J. Schmertz, Arbitrator
DATED:

August 29, 1995

STATE OF NEW YORK

)

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

ss:

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Impartial Chairman that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

x
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
AWARD
Local 369, Utility Workers of
America, AFL-CIO

and

P&M GRIEVANCES
NOS. 4786 & 4990

Boston Edison Company

The Undersigned, duly designated as the Board of
Arbitration in the above matter and having duly heard
the proofs and allegations of said parties, make the
following AWARD:
(1) The Company violated the collective
bargaining agreement by the suspension with final warning of Shepherd
Adams in November 1993. The suspension is reversed and Adams shall be
made whole for the time lost. The
final warning shall be expunged from
his record.
(2) The termination (and suspension) of
Adams in September 1994 violated the
collective bargaining agreement. Adams
shall be reinstated, but without back
pay. A final warning shall attach to
the reinstatement.

Eric J. Schmertz
DATED: September 28, 1995
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )ss.:

Chairman

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.
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John F. Holland, Jr.
Concurring in #1
Concurring in #2
Dissenting from #2
DATED:
STATE OF
COUNTY OF
I, John F. Holland, Jr. do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

Lisa K. Amber
Dissenting from #1
Concurring in #2
Dissenting from #2
DATED:
STATE OF
COUNTY OF
I, Lisa K. Amber do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

X
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
OPINION AND AWARD
P & M 4766 and 4990
Local 369, Utility Workers Union
of America, AFL-CIO
and

Boston Edison Company

In accordance with the arbitration provisions of the
collective bargaining agreement between the above-named Union
and Company, the Undersigned was selected as the Chairman of a
tri-partite Board of Arbitration to hear and decide the
following stipulated issue:
Did the Company violate the collective
bargaining agreement by the suspension
with final warning of Shepherd Adams in
November 1993 or by the suspension and
termination of Shepherd Adams in September
1994? If so what shall be the remedy?
In shorter form the issue under the contract is whether
there was just cause for the aforesaid suspension and
discharge.
Ms. Lisa K. Amber and Mr. John F. Holland, Jr. served
respectively as the Company and Union arbitrators on the
Board of Arbitration.
Hearings were held on March 10, April 3, and May 18,
1995.

Mr. Adams, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant"

and representatives of the Union and Company appeared and
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were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument
and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
Arbitrators was waived.

The Oath of the

A stenographic record was taken.

The parties filed post-hearing briefs, and the Board met in
executive session on April 30, 1995.
Suspension and Final Warning
in November 1993
The grievant was a "Troubleshooter."
Prior to the November 1993 suspension and final warning
the grievant was suspended for an admitted negligent work
practice (improperly cutting a live cable).

On November 2,

virtually his first day back at work following that
suspension, the grievant was assigned a job to "remove a
jumper" at a private residence.

He was given the assignment

by Supervisor John O'Neill at about 8 AM that day.

The

Company asserts that O'Neill told the grievant that it was "a
pre-arranged appointment" with the resident of that location;
that she was a school teacher and had to leave home at 9 AM;
and that he "was to get right over there" or "get there no
later than 9 AM" so that he could get in.

Other Company

personnel were also assigned, and there was also a police
presence.
By his own acknowledgement the grievant arrived at the

-3-

work location, at about 9:20 AM.i
it was as late as 9:45.

The Company suggests that

Either way the school teacher had

left, the grievant could not get into the premises, the
assigned crew was disbanded (as was the police) and the job
had to be rescheduled for another time.
The Company charges the grievant with a willful failure
to carry out the explicit directive to get to the job by or
before 9 AM.

And that against the backdrop of his prior

disciplinary record (which is extensive and which contains
prior suspensions, including the suspension of only a few
days earlier) the instant suspension and final warning were
warranted and for just cause.
The grievant and the Union on his behalf deny that he
was told to be at the location by 9 AM; that rather he
understood the job to be a routine assignment and that in
accordance with a regular practice followed by the
troubleshooters and not objected to by the Company, he went
for coffee after stocking his truck and leaving the Company's

iThe Company concedes that normally when time is not of the
essence, troubleshooters do and may stop for coffee before
reporting for their morning assignments.
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yard, and hence arrived at the work location at 9:20 AM
As with all disciplinary actions the Company has the
burden to show just cause by evidence that is clear and
convincing.

I do not think that the differing testimony

about what instructions O'Neill gave the grievant requires a
determination of credibility. I think it quite possible, and
the essential facts so indicate, that the instructions given,
and what the grievant heard and understood added up, as a
totality, to a mis-communication.
The instructions given the grievant were oral.

He was

given a written note which was limited to the address.

That

note did not instruct the grievant when he was to arrive nor
did it refer to the asserted "pre-arranged" appointment.
O'Neill's testimony on the point varies.

First he

stated that he told the grievant "to get over there right
away," without a specific time instruction.

Later in his

testimony he stated that he told the grievant to be there by
9 AM and why.

The Company's brief recites the former -

namely that he told the grievant to "go right over."

-5-

In the absence of written instructions I am neither
clear nor certain what O'Nell said and how precise he was
about when the grievant was to arrive.

And I cannot impute

precise knowledge to the grievant under those circumstances.
Indeed, considering the allowed practice of getting coffee
after loading the truck, and the ambiguousness of the limited
instruction to "go right over," I cannot conclude that an
arrival at 9:202 was unreasonable or in non-compliance.
The Company's position is supported by Supervisor Peter
Kane, who testified that he was in the control room that
morning and heard O'Neill tell the grievant to "be there by 9
AM, because the teacher had to leave by then."

But Kane's

subsequent activities are not consistent with this testimony
or that instruction.
Because of the grievant's mistake in cutting a live
cable which gave rise to an earlier unchallenged suspension
(and apparently because of the grievant's less than exemplary
work record) Kane was assigned to accompany and observe the

2The Company's belief that the grievant did not arrive until
9:45 is not proved. It is based on a Supervisor's efforts to
locate him at a coffee shop beginning shortly after 9 AM and
thereafter seeing him on the job at 9:45 AM. But there is no
evidence that in the interim, between 9:20 and 9:45 the
grievant was not at the work location. And therefore
whether the grievant could or should have heard the radio
calls, is immaterial.
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grievant and his work the entire day of November 2, 1993.
Indeed, he acknowledges that he was in the control room that
morning so that he could begin observing the grievant and "to
be sure the grievant understood the assignment."
Yet Kane, who was instructed to observe all the
grievant's work activities that day, did not himself arrive
at the job location until 9:05 AM.

It is stipulated in the

record that the work the grievant was to do would take about
10 minutes to complete.

If the grievant had arrived shortly

before or at 9 AM as the Company says he was instructed to
do, he might well have completed the job by 9:05 when Kane
arrived, and Kane though assigned to do so, would not have
been able to observe the grievant's work practices on that
day's first assignment.
There may be a number of reasons why Kane arrived at
9:05, and he may have intended to arrive earlier.
evidence in explanation was offered.

But no

Under this circum-

stance, considering the standard of proof required of the
Company, I must conclude that Kane himself was either not
clear when the job was to begin or uncertain that the time of
arrival to begin the job was of the essence or so critical.
I find therefore that what Kane said he heard O'Neill
tell the grievant has not been proved to be what the
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grievant heard or should have heard.
Nor, under those conflicting and inconsistent
circumstances can the instructions asserted by the Company be
reasonably imputed to the grievant with sufficient
conclusiveness.
Also, following the grievant's suspension and final
warning, an unusual event occurred.

O'Neill and Kane called

and spoke to the grievant by phone and in substance expressed
regret or sympathy about what happened. The Union
characterizes it as an "apology."

The Company says it was an

expression of "sorrow" because the grievant was "liked," but
that in no way was it a concession that the grievant was not
culpable or the penalty not proper.
Whatever the purpose or intent of the call, it was
friendly and sympathetic to the grievant's predicament.

I

deem such a call by a supervisor, who is essentially
responsible for the discipline, to be extraordinary, and a
further indication of the ambiguousness of the events leading
to that discipline.

In my view it is not unreasonable to

interprete the call, and the "sorrow" expressed as an
indication that O'Neill and Kane did not believe that the
grievant was entirely at fault and that the penalty imposed
on him was, though not reversed by them,
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unwarranted.

In short, and again, this event, uncommon in my

experience after a supervisor has triggered a disciplinary
penalty, supports the reasonable possibility that what was
said by O'Neill to the grievant at 8 AM in the control room
and what the grievant heard or understood was a miscommunication .
In sum, the entire set of circumstances remain too
unclear, ambiguous and indeterminate to meet the requisite
disciplinary standard of "clear and convincing."
With the foregoing it is unnecessary for me to assess
the Union's argument that following a virtual immediate
return from a suspension for cutting a live cable the
grievant would not have been so foolish as to risk further
discipline by ignoring an explicit work order.

However I

would observe that standing alone this is not enough of a
defense.

I have seen too many foolish and irrational acts to

allow sole reliance on what is logical.
However for the other foregoing reasons I shall reverse
the suspension and final warning, direct that they be
expunged from the grievant's record and direct that he be
made whole.
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Suspension and Discharge
in September 1994
It is clear and undisputed that but for the above
referred-to final warning, the charges against the grievant
arising from his assignment on September 17 and 18, 1994 to
locate a fault, would not have been grounds for his
discharge.

The question of the propriety of the discharge is

no longer at issue therefore, in view of my reversal of the
prior final warning. The same is true for the "suspension"
preliminary to and then subsumed in the discharge.
The issue at this point is whether the charge against
the grievant of "poor work performance" has been proved by
clear and convincing evidence, and if so what penalty short
of discharge, should be imposed.
In performing his assignment to troubleshoot a fault,
the grievant is charged with (1) an erroneous tentative
location of the fault, (2) a failure to follow prescribed
procedures by not using the "Thumper" a second time to test
the system after "breaking down" a particular manhole, (3)
by telling the dispatcher that he "was certain" the fault
was between manholes 21169 and 21168 and by so reporting
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that finding unconditionally in his daily Trouble and
Operation Report, with his written statement thereon to
"Replace 1 Section of 50015K P & 2 Cable" between those manholes and (4) by leaving the job without permission of
supervision and without "proving" the fault he reported by a
final use of the Thumper.
I find that the grievant make mistakes, but so did the
dispatcher and supervision.
After "breaking down" manhole 21169 the grievant did
not return to the station to activate the Thumper as
procedures require and as he said he planned to do in his
call to his dispatcher.

In that call which began at 12:37

AM the grievant said
"Broke down MH21169
go(ing
back to the station...to prove
that I still have it... and turn
I'm coming back to MH21168..."
The grievant's words are prospective.
going back."

He says he "is

Therefore I reject the Union's assertion that

the grievant had returned to the station and used the Thumper
earlier after breaking down MH21169. Rather I accept as
accurate the Company's evidence that if the grievant returned
to the station after telling the dispatcher he planned to do
so, he could not have been able to enter the station or
activate the Thumper because the station operator had left
well before that time.

-11-

I find therefore that despite his assertion otherwise, the
grievant did not use the Thumper after breaking down manhole
21169 and that he "cut corners" by not even attempting to do
so,
Next, though I find nothing wrong his original tentative
fault location between manholes 21168 and 21169 (and the
Company concedes that at that point a tentative finding was
not an error of procedure), I do find that he erred by
telling the dispatcher that he was "sure" of the fault
location.
In his call to the dispatcher, the grievant said at 0205
AM on September 18
"... its definitely in the section..."
The dispatcher asked:
"so you are sure about that"
The grievant replied:
"sure"
Also serious are the unconditional statements on his
Trouble and Operations Report about the location of the fault
and the repair work to be done.

He failed to note anywhere

on his Report that he had left the work before "proving" the
fault with a final use of the Thumper, nor did he indicate
that his tentative fault location was still to be proved.

-12-

I do not find him liable for not making a final use of
the Thumper, because by then the Thumper operator had left;
the Thumper was disconnected and troubleshooters are not
permitted to attach or re-attach the Thumper cables.
However, as a troubleshooter, highly skilled and highly
paid, and who is considered the "eyes and ears" of the
Company in finding faults and making repairs, he had a duty
to make clear not just to the bargaining unit dispatcher but
also to supervision by special report or at least on his
official Trouble and Operations Report of the unproved status
of the fault he believed he found. He also had a duty to
report that he left the job without proving it and why.
As it turned out, the Company relied on the Report and
replaced the cable between manholes 21169 and 21168.

And

when the system was thereafter activated a fault occurred in
a different nearby manhole, causing a fire, smoke, and an
outage and required fire department response.
On the assumption that the fault the grievant was
seeking was at this latter location and not between manholes
21168 and 21169, the subsequent cable failure is attributable to the grievant's Report and to supervision's lack of
knowledge that the "tentative" fault between 21168 and 21169
had not been proved by the grievant before he left the job.

-13-

Also, though the grievant had worked some 18 hours
straight on the job in inclement weather and was unquestionably fatigued, he left the job improperly.

The proper

procedure is not merely to tell the bargaining unit
dispatcher that he is leaving, but to notify and obtain
permission of managerial supervision to do so and to request
a replacement.

Wrongly, he rejected a replacement for

himself and a replacement for the Thumper operator.

In his

talk with the dispatcher and in reply to the dispatcher's
question
"so do you want an operator at 329?
... do you still want him"
The grievant replied:
"No...No I don't want him now."
By not doing so for either, supervision did not know
that the Thumper was no longer usable or that the fault could
not be proved.

Supervision was not given the chance or

option of getting another Thumper operator or the chance to
assign another Trouble-shooter to replace the grievant. And
to see to it that the replacement used the Thumper as the
final step to prove the fault.
On the other hand I am satisfied that by practice,
Troubleshooters rely on the dispatcher to convey essential
informtion to managerial supervision.

Here, apparently, the

grievant expected the dispatcher to tell supervision that

-14-

despite the grievant's "certainty" over where he believed
the fault was located, it was not proved.

Also apparently,

the dispatcher who was inexperienced in that job, did not do
so.

I think that the dispatcher, who is the communications

link between the troubleshooter and the Company, should have
done so, and therefore erred to the Company's disadvantage
and the grievant's prejudice. However this expection of what
the dispatcher should have done, did not relieve the grievant
from the duties and responsibilities previously enumerated.
Also, I find that management acted imprudently.

I see

no reason why, where safety and service are at stake, it
relied solely on the grievant's Report, assuming therefrom
that the fault location had been proved.

It seems to me that

in such a sensitive matter the transcript or tape of the
conversation between a Troubleshooter and a dispatcher should
be reviewed to be certain that what was reported on the Work
Report is accurate and complete.

Had management reviewed

that transcript (and what other better reason is there for
taping those conversations) it would have known the fault had
not been proved and steps could have been taken to prove it,

-15-

or as the Company alleges in this case, disprove it.

So, I

attribute some blame to management.
Finally, that a fault was found in a different manhole
when the system was activated after the grievant's work,
meant to the Company that the grievant erred in his tentative
findings.

That may be so, but again applying the requisite

evidentiary standard, that has not been established.

Company

witnesses on cross-examination acknowledge the "possibility"
of two faults, the one that eventually occurred and the one
the grievant believed was between manholes 21168 and 21169.
Any doubt about the possibility would have been dispelled,
and the Company's charge againat the grievant further
supported, if the replaced cable between manholes 21168 and
21169 had been inspected and had not shown a fault or defect.
But the Company discarded that cable when it was replaced and
apparently it was not inspected.

No evidence of its

condition was offered.So the possibility of two faults, which
I cannot find unreasonable, if not probable, remains.

Yet

such speculation would be unnecessary if the grievant made
clear what he had done and not done and especially what he
had not proved.
Based on all the foregoing the grievant cannot be found
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blameless.

His reinstatement is mandated. But considering

the errors he made, the consequences of those errors, his
prior disciplinary record which includes several reprimands
and suspensions for work-related violations, the fact that he
received unemployment insurance, and if he was not employed
elsewhere, his failure to offer evidence of efforts at
mitigation, his reinstatement shall be without back pay.
lack of back pay shall be deemed a suspension.

Also, as

another disciplinary suspension in his accumulated
disciplinary record a final warning shall attach to that
suspension and reinstatement.

Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman
DATED: September 28,1995

The

-x
IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA,
LOCAL NO. 12003

AWARD

and
BOSTON GAS COMPANY
-X

The Undersigned, duly designated as the Board of Arbitration in
the above matter and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the
above-named Company and Union make the following AWARD:
The Company did not violate the collective bargaining
agreement when it changed its method of payment of
wages from payment in hand to mail delivery.

Eric J. Schmertz, Chairman

DATED:

January 6, 1995

STATE OF NEW YORK

)

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

ss:

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Chairman
that I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument,
which is my AWARD.

-X

IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
OPINION OF THE
CHAIRMAN

UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA,
,OCAL NO. 12003

and
BOSTON GAS COMPANY
-X

In accordance with Article XII of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement dated May 21, 1993 between United Steelworkers of America, Local
12003,hereinafter referred

to as the "Union" and Boston Gas Company,

lereinafter referred to as the "Company," the Undersigned was selected as
the Chairman of a tripartite Board of Arbitration to hear and decide,
together with the Union and Company designees to said board, the following
stipulated issue:
Did the Company violate the collective bargaining
agreement when it changed its method of payment of
wages from payment in hand to mail delivery? And, if
so, what shall be the remedy?
Messrs. Edward J. Maloney and Mark E. Smith served respectively
as the Union and Company members of the Board of Arbitration.
A

hearing

was

held

on

October

Massachusetts at which time representatives

4,

1994

in

Braintree,

of the Union and Company

appeared and were afforded the full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross examine witnesses.

The Oath of the of

Arbitrators was waived; a stenographic record of the hearing was taken;
and the parties filed post hearing briefs.
The Board of Arbitration met in executive session on December
28, 1994.

From at least 1970 and until June of 1993 the Company paid its
employees, represented by the Union, by hand delivering their checks to
them personally on Thursday of each week.
In June of 1993 following the end of a lengthy lockout, the
Company informed the Union and implemented the instant disputed policy of
mailing employees their pay checks on Wednesday of each week.1
It is the Union's position that the payment of wages in person
from 1970 to 1993 became a past practice which ripened into an implied
bilateral provision of the contract.

And that as such it can be changed

only by bilateral collective bargaining, not by the Company's unilateral
action.

Additionally, the Union asserts that the Company's unilateral

change in the method of paying wages seriously inconvenienced the affected
employees.

For example, employees could not, as previously, cash their

pay checks on Thursdays at the credit union or at banks, and that because
some employees did not receive their pay checks through the mail until
Friday or Saturday following the Wednesday mailing or in some cases not
until Monday of the following week, they not only did not have the same
access to cash as before, but did not have as much opportunity to notify
the Company of errors

in or omissions from those checks in time for

corrections in the next week's check.
The Company's position simply is that the methodology of making
payments of wages

is a management prerogative, and that the Company

retained the unilateral right to make a change in that methodology so long
as it was consistent with the law.

(There is no dispute in this case over

the legality of the payment of wages by check through the mail).

Curing the lockout monies owed to any of the employees were
paid by check through the mail, as the bargaining unit employees
were prohibited from entering on the Company property during that
period of time.

The Company also points out that the collective

bargaining

agreement contains no provision dealing with the procedural methods of
paying wages and that the change from in person payment is nothing more
than a change in a "method of operation," which does not acquire the
status of an implied contract provision or a condition of employment.
Moreover, the Company offered testimony designed to show that
this change improved the efficiency of the work force and productivity;
and that the impact on the employees was at most de minimus, and not
different from before the change.
I agree with the Union that the payment of wages by in person
delivery of checks for at least 23 years meets the test of an employment
related past practice.
that procedure.

As

There is no dispute over the extensive length of
the payment of wages for services performed is

directly related to the employment relationship, I am satisfied that the
method of making that payment is also employment related.
over those 23 years was unvaried.
characterizes

as

The Company's citations of what it

"variations" are not variations

factually different.

The procedure

at all.

They are

The examples given of circumstances where pay checks

were mailed to employees pertained in each instance to employees who were
not actively

at work

during the relevant pay period, but rather on

vacation, ill, disabled, or on leave of absence.

So, those examples

involved employees not similarly situated to the grievants in this case.
In short, the examples cited by the Company are hot relevant variations of
the procedure of paying wages in person and do not negate or vitiate the
long standing in-person payment procedure for employees at work.
Accordingly, the methodology of paying employees actively at
work for the period 1970 to 1993 meets the test of a consistent, unvaried,
and employment related past practice.

The stipulated issue accords the Board of Arbitration limited
authority

—

namely the power to determine whether the change in the

method of paying wages violated the collective bargaining agreement.

If

the contract prohibits what the Company did, it is neither an excuse nor
relevant

if

the

productivity.

change

has

improved

the

Company's

efficiency

and

Conversely, if there is no contractual bar to the Company's

action, that employees may be more inconvenienced by experiencing some
delay in converting their checks to cash or in notifying the Company of
errors, is also irrelevant.
Narrowed to the question of whether the contract has or has not
been violated, it is undisputed that the contract contains no specific
provision

regarding

the

methodology

of

paying

wages.

It

is

also

stipulated that the question or issue of the method of payment was not
discussed or even raised in contract negotiations.2 The only provision in
the contract which has relevance to the instant dispute, (and which will
be more fully discussed later in this Opinion), is Article XIII Section 3
which reads:/-

~ ~

—^~.-..„.„.. , „ „ , _ „ , _ „ _

/^Article XIII
"
/
Section 3.
Changes — It is the intention of the
Company to make no substantial changes in working
conditions which are in effect and are not covered by
this Agreement. If any such changes are to be made,
prompt and reasonable notice will be given to the
Local Union President or his designee and the. matter
\d at a meeting of the Joint Committee (Article
\, Section 1) prior to the Company's making the
change unless unusual circumstances make such notic
or discussion impractical.
/

2The record shows that the parties did negotiate on a
Company proposal that the pay period bg^changed from weekly to
bi-weekly and that there be a change in the timing of the payment
of the Union checkoff. The Union rejected those proposals and
the Company withdrew them.

The Company contends that Article XIII Section 3 is inapplicable
because the Company's action was not a change "in working condition" but
only an "operational change."

Similarly, it is the Union's position that

Article XIII Section 3 is inapplicable because, matured to an implied
condition of the contract, the past practice is not, therefore, a "working
condition...not covered by this agreement" (emphasis added), but rather,
contractually implied, a working condition covered by the agreement.3
My

analysis

is different.

Though

the payment methodology

Between 1970 and 1993 meets the test of a past practice, I do not conclude
that it created a new, independent, implied.contractual provision. Rather
I am satisfied that subsumed within Article XIII Section 3 are employmentrelated past practices that are not otherwise explicitly covered by the
contract. Article XIII Section 3 deals with "working conditions which are
in effect and are not covered by this agreement."

(emphasis added)

A

past practice that is employment related is, to my mind, a "working
condition which (is) in effect and not covered by this Agreement."

In my

judgement, Article XIII Section 3 was designed and intended to protect and
perpetuate as working conditions employment-related past practices where
the contract

is otherwise silent on those condition.

Manifestly the

payment of wages weekly by in hand delivery on the job, as an employmentrelated past practice, is a working condition which was in effect though
not specifically covered by the Agreement.
But for Article XIII, Section 3, I would have found that the
past practice

of in person payment had become an implied contractual

provision, independent of other contract provisions.
Section 3 produces a different result.

But Article XIII

It not only expressly incorporates

^Alternatively the Union argues that if Article XIII Section
3 is applicable, the Company failed to comply with the notice
requirements thereof, making its unilateral action a nullity.

past practices into the contract as working conditions, but sets forth the
circumstances under which the Company may make changes in those working
conditions.
Company

So, the question is not whether the unilateral change by the

of the

employment related

past practice violated

an implied

condition of the contract, but rather whether that unilateral change
violated Article XIII Section 3 of the contract.
Based on the record before me I conclude that the change the
Company made did not violate Article XIII Section 3.

A full reading of

that provision of the contract clearly shows that the Company is barred
rom made substantial changes in working conditions (or employment related
aast practices) . And that if it makes such a change, meaning, of course,
a substantial change, it must follow the notice and discussion procedures
required

by that

section of the contract.

Conversely, Article XIII

Section 3 would allow the Company to make unilateral changes in working
conditions

or

•substantial."

employment

related

past

practices

that

are

not

And if not substantial, the procedural requirements of

notice and discussion do not come into play.
Obviously, therefore, the final question is whether the change
which the Company made in this case by mailing the checks to the employees
on Wednesday of each week rather than delivering them to them at work on
Thursdays,

constituted

Article XIII Section 3.

a "substantial

change" within the meaning of

The evidence before me does not persuade me that

the change was "substantial."
The testimony on the numbers of employees who had problems with
their checks showed no significant increase after the change in the
methodology.

About as many found errors in their checks after the change

as before the change.

And the same was true with regard to how many and

how often employees received another person's check along with their own.

I do see one particular effect that could be a disadvantage to
an affected employee.

And that is that with mail delivery those employees

who before cashed their checks on Thursdays at the credit union or at
banks on their way home, can no longer do so.

They receive their checks,

at the earliest, on Thursday at home, and unless they can cash them that
evening, must wait until Friday to do so.
But the record does not provide definitive information on what
percentage of the employees previously cashed their checks on Thursdays,
so I am unable to assess the magnitude of that variation.

Therefore, I

cannot reach a judgement that it is a "substantial" effect.
The same is the case regarding the Union's assertion that some
employees do not get their checks until Friday or Saturday or even not
until Monday of the following week.

In the absence of some reasonably

precise numbers or percentages of employees so affected, and with the
logical and realistic

probability that it is small, I cannot make a

definitive conclusion that any such impact is "substantial."
Also, with regard to this latter group, there is insufficient
evidence to conclude that if errors in their checks are found by employees
in that small group, they did not or would not have time to notify the
Company of those errors by noon the following Monday, to insure correction
in the next week's pay check.

At most, in the absence of more exact

numbers,

small

and

considering

the

probability

of

this

particular

impediment arising and the probable few employe.es affected, I must judge
the impact or potential impact to be de minimus.
Finally, let me observe that I do not think that any of the
problems arising from the change are chronic.
"bugs" in the process in its early stages.

I think there may have been

But inexorably, as the process

becomes smoother, as the mailing of checks becomes more proficient, and as

voluntary direct deposit (which apparently is increasing and which gives
the employees immediate cash at this banks from the deposited checks)
becomes more popular, the complained of dislocations should decrease if
not be eliminated.

Additionally, it is suggested that the Company review

its consideration of mailing the checks, a day earlier, on Tuesdays.

Eric J. Schmertz, Chairman

DATED:

January 6, 1995

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,
ADMINISTRATOR
X

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO,
LOCAL 1212

OPINION AND AWARD
Case # 13 300 00149 95

-andCBS, Inc.

In accordance with the arbitration provisions of the collective
bargaining

agreement

between the above-named

Union and Employer, the

Undersigned was appointed as the Arbitrator to hear and decide a dispute
relating to Mr. Richard Consiglio.
A hearing was held on July 29, 1995 at which time Mr. Consiglio,
hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and representatives
and the Employer, appeared.

of the Union

All concerned were afforded full opportunity

to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine

witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived, a stenographic record of the hearing was
taken, and the parties filed post-hearing briefs.
Absent the agreement of the parties on a stipulated

issue, I

deem the issue, based on the record before me, to be:
Was there just cause for the Employer's refusal to
permit the grievant to return to active

employment?

If not, what shall be the remedy?
More specifically, the dispute centers on the Employer's denial
of the grievant's request to return to work on or about January 26, 1995,

following the grievant's recovery from disability, because of and pending
the outcome of criminal charges against him as set forth in an indictment
by a Rockland County grand jury (IND. NO. 94-314).
The indictment charges the grievant with the crimes of Reckless
Endangerment in the Second Degree, Menacing in the Second Degree, Criminal
Possession of a Weapon in the Fourth Degree and Criminal Possession of a
Controlled Substance in the Seventh Degree.
In further refinement of the issue, I deem the Employer's action
to constitute

a suspension of the grievant until the charges

in the

indictment are determined, dismissed or withdrawn.1
The circumstances of the event, as presented by both sides are
essentially the same.

On Thanksgiving Day, 1994, at a party, the grievant

abused cocaine and alcohol.
the party and went home.

Angry with him for doing so, his wife left

The grievant stayed the night, and travelled

home by taxi cab the next day.

Upon arriving home, the grievant's wife

angrily left the house, and apparently summoned the police.

The grievant

tried to "sleep off" the effects of the drug and alcohol, but was awakened
by the police knocking on his door and requesting permission to enter.
The grievant denied their entry without a search warrant.
Upset by what he concluded was his wife's report to the police,
the grievant loaded and fired his shot gun into the lock of his wife's
jewelry box, removed her jewels and flushed them down the toilet.

He then

discharged the shot gun a second time, into the television set or into the
ceiling.

The police,

again attempted

to enter this house,

but the

'As of this date and based on the probative record before me,
the indictment obtains and, no trial has taken place. The Union
asserts, but has offered no documentary proof or testimony thereof,
that a motion to dismiss the charge related to "possession of a
controlled substance" has been granted, and a motion to dismiss the
entire indictment has been made.

grievant

told

them

that

he

would

commit

suicide

if

they

did, and,

according to his testimony, assumed a "suicide position" with the shot gun
under his chin.
Later, after sleeping in his car, and after the police broke
windows in the house and had the gas and electrical services turned off,
the grievant surrendered, was arrested and jailed.
Obviously, it is not my role to "try" the criminal charges or to
determine if the indictment squares with the facts and evidence.
for the Criminal Court.

What is before me is whether,

That is

based on the

information the Employer obtained from the indictment and from its own
subsequent investigation, and from the evidence adduced at the hearing, it
had proper grounds to place the grievant in suspended status, until the
Criminal Court acted.
I

consider

the

facts

surrounding

disability, immaterial to this case.

the

grievant's

earlier

He claims he was injured from an

assault by a policeman who stopped his car to check on whether he was
driving intoxicated.

The Employer asserts that its information

the grievant assaulted the policeman.
in

this

record

in

support

of

either

is that

As there is no probative evidence
contention,

that

event

has no

evidentiary value in the instant proceeding. Moreover, though charges for
that

incident

may

be

pending

or contemplated,

I

conclude

that

the

disability and its causes were not a reason for the grievant's subsequent
suspension.
Some differences between the charges in the indictment and the
events which resulted in the indictment were adduced at the hearing.

There may be some question of whether the grievant "threatened
the police with a shot gun" or "held the police at bay with a shot gun" or
"endangered

other

persons."2

Nonetheless,

his

admitted

actions

were

extremely dangerous to himself and at least potentially dangerous to the
police.
and

He admits he was still under the influence of drugs and alcohol,

manifestly,

his

mental

and

emotional

stability

was

seriously

compromised.
The arbitral question is whether this "off duty" conduct, the
criminal charges arising therefrom, and the facts as developed at the
hearing are sufficiently related or germane to the grievant's employment
setting to foreclose his return to active work.3
The arbitral rules on such set of circumstances are adequately
settled.
the

If the off-duty misconduct has a discernable negative impact on

employee's

job, or

on his

employer's

reputation,

or presents a

reasonable potential for a detrimental effect on the employer's business
or the

conduct

of its business, or if the

nature

of the offense is

contrary to or inconsistent with the duties and responsibilities of the
employee's job, the employer has the managerial right to refuse or defer
employment or re-employment.
the foregoing

This is not to say that with the presence of

impact, a criminal indictment standing

alone without a

finding of guilt, would make a discharge of an accused employee proper.

2The grievant was alone in his house, and the shot gun was
discharged within the house.
3The Union argues that the events are unrelated and irrelevant
to the grievant's job because he was on disability and not working
at the time, and they occurred off the Employer's property and not
in the course of or in connection with his employment.

In my judgement, such summary and final action by an employer when an
employee is only accused, is violative of "due process" and violative of
the fundamental presumption of "innocence until proven guilty."

So, I

would not have sustained a discharge of the grievant.
But he is not discharged. He is suspended, pending the outcome
of the charges.4
I find that the ' facts of the events leading to the charges,
though arguably somewhat less serious than the charges themselves, are
sufficiently

serious

and

significantly

related

to

the

grievant's

employment status, to support and affirm the propriety of the suspension.
I find it reasonable to conclude that if the grievant had been
permitted to return to work it would have been discernably disruptive to
the Employer's business and services.
worked

with

supervision.
expressed

some

300

other

The grievant is a Technician.

employees-- of

that

classification

He
and

That some five employees, bargaining unit and supervisory,

concern

about the effect of his return to work while the

criminal charges were pending, is evidence to me of some realistic unrest
among the grievant's fellow technicians and within that department.
not prepared

to accept the Union's

expressions of concern are de minimis.

argument

that

I am

five complaints or

I cannot reject as unreasonable,

the Employer's conclusion that they represented a more widespread feeling
within the department and among others who would work with the grievant.

4Though not within my authority under the issue as presented,
it is my view that consistent with the "due process" that the
Employer says it accorded the grievant, an acquittal verdict, or a
dismissal or withdrawal of the charges, would entitle the grievant
to reinstatement and to be made whole.

Moreover, I do not find it unreasonable —

and certainly not

arbitrary or capricious -- for the Employer to be concerned about the
safety of other employees and the safety to commercial and public visitors
to the grievant's work area.

On that question, and especially in the

absence of any medical or expert testimony on the grievant's present
mental and emotional state, I am not prepared to substitute my judgement
for that of the Employer, when safety is the Employer's responsibility.
This is not to say that I conclude that others would be in
danger from the grievant, but rather that the Employer's judgement that
unsafe conditions could result from the grievant's return at this time or
when

he

sought

to

return,

is

unreasonable as to be rejected.

not

so

implausible, unrealistic

or

In short, there is no evidence showing me

that the grievant's conduct was an isolated incident and not likely to
reoccur.
I have considered the Union's view that the safety argument is
speculative

and

unrealistic

in view of the

personnel maintained by the Employer.

security

procedures and

The fact is, however, that the

possibility of an unsafe condition is connected to and arises from the
grievant's dangerous behavior and not from some imagined source.

That

being so, I cannot treat the concern as unfoundedly speculative, nor am I
prepared to find, absent agreement of the Employer, that existing security
forces and procedures would be adequately protective.
So, a nexus has been shown between the grievant's

off-duty

misconduct, and its impact on the efficient and orderly operation of the
Employer's business if he was returned to work.

I

do

not

find that the Employer violated any contractual

procedures in ordering the suspension.

It was not a discharge, so the

notice requirements of Section 5.10(a) of the contract is not applicable.
And, considering the probable imminence of rulings by the Court or a
trial,

the

grievant's

status

"constructive discharge."

has

not

yet

reached

the

point

of a

Additionally, considering the expedited nature

of the grievance, and the verbal, but mutual agreement for it to go
directly to arbitration, I see no violation in this case of any "practice"
of serving prior notice in cases of suspensions.
Nor

do

I see discriminatory or disparate treatment

of the

grievant when compared to actions regarding other employees who suffer
from drug or alcohol addiction.

Those employees with drug or alcohol

problems who were and are accorded a chance at rehabilitation through
treatment rather than discipline, did not .commit offenses that resulted in
criminal charges.

I accept as correct the assertion that the grievant's

onduct was related directly to his abuse of cocaine and alcohol. But the
consequences of that abuse, namely the criminal charges, distinguishes the
grievant from those other employees, and justifies different action.
Finally, there is not enough in the record of any practice of
treating other

(or another) employees who committed a serious criminal

offense less harshly than the grievant.

Two cases were cited.

In one,

the employee's suspension while under criminal indictment apparently was
not challenged, and following his acquittal he was reinstated.

The facts

in the other, the Cooper case, were not defined, as the Arbitrator wrote
no Opinion.

For those reasons, neither are probatively precedential for

the instant matter.

The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and having
duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named parties, makes
the following AWARD:
Pending

the

outcome

of

the

criminal

indictment against Richard Consiglio, and
without

prejudice to the

parties

and

Mr.

rights

Consiglio

of

the

after

determination or disposition of the charges
of

the

indictment,

the

Employer's

suspension of Mr. Consiglio, was for just
cause and is upheld.

Eric J. Schmertz, Arbitrator
DATED:

October 24, 1995

STATE OF NEW YORK

)

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

ss:

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrator
that I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument,
which is my AWARD.

^ERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,
ADMINISTRATOR
N THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
OPINION AND AWARD
Case # 52-300-0016194

BEW LOCAL 1400
and
CITIZENS GAS & COKE UTILITY

X
The stipulated issue is:
Was there just cause for the discharge of CHRISTOPHER
HOAGLIN?

If not, what shall be the remedy?

A hearing was held in Indianapolis, Indiana on December 1, 1994
at which time Mr. Hoaglin hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and
epresentatives

of the above-named Union and Company appeared.

All

concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument
and to examine and cross examine witnesses.

The Arbitrators Oath was

vaived; a stenographic record of the hearing was taken and the parties
filed post-hearing briefs.
The essential facts are not in dispute.

The Company received

several anonymous reports of the use of illegal drugs by its employees and
found drug use paraphernalia on its premises.

Also, drugs were found in

the systems of two employees who died in work related accidents.
So

prompted,

the

Company

hired

an

undercover

agent

to

investigate drug use among the employees.
On August 11, 1993, during working hours and following a series
)f earlier discussions between the agent and the grievant in which the

grievant denied drug use, the grievant agreed to and arranged to sell to
the undercover agent 1/4 of an ounce of marijuana. Further details of the
sale were to be confirmed in a subsequent telephone conversation between
them which was to take place or took place off Company premises and
outside

of working

hours.

The sale, itself, was to be consummated

thereafter in accordance with those arrangements, again off premises and
outside of working hours.
The grievant was discharged on October 21, 1993 for violation of
Company work rules, specifically for "making a deal on Company premises to
sell marijuana."
Though the enumerated work rules do not explicitly refer to this
jcharge, the Company refers to and relies on its "general rule" which
states:
"The Utility reserves the right to take disciplinary
action as may be justified for any proper cause."

The Company asserts that the grievant's engagement on Company
roperty

in arranging a drug sale constituted "proper cause" for his

ischarge.
The

allegation

of

an agreement

to

sell

marijuana

to the

andercover agent is not denied by the grievant or the Union.
However, in defense, the Union contends that the grievant was
'entraped"; that he violated no specific work rule; that if there was a
sale of the marijuana it was off Company property and on the grievant's
own time and hence not actionable by the Company; that the grievant had

ot used drugs and was not impaired by drug use as proscribed by the
ompany's drug and alcohol policy; that the grievant was not accorded
progressive discipline"; and that the police authorities chose not to
ake criminal action against him.
I agree with the Union that the undercover agent persisted in
iscussing drugs with the grievant several times before August 11, 1993
nd that but for his persistence it is improbable that the grievant would
lave participated in the transaction.

Specifically, it is undisputed that

n those prior discussions between them the grievant repeatedly denied
using drugs and acknowledged that to do so would jeopardize his job.

Had

the agent terminated his efforts at that point I think it unlikely that
the subsequent arrangement for the sale and transfer of the marijuana
/ould have been made.
But I do not see this as entrapment.

The undercover agent's

testimony, which I deem creditable, shows that at some point, namely on or
y

August

llth,

the

grievant

had

become

a

willing

and uncoerced

articipant in the sale agreement. That he was not receptive earlier does
lot mean that he was tricked, misled, coerced or otherwise involuntarily
.ed to the August llth transaction.
record

before me,

At that later point, and based on the

I conclude that the grievant became a voluntary

sarticipant and a willing partner in what he believed was a bonafide
transaction.

Indeed, there is probative evidence indicating that he

Initiated the specifics of the sale.
That he may have exhibited poor judgement is not an element of
entrapment, even assuming that entrapment, which technically is a legal

defense to a criminal charge, is a cognisable defense in a non-criminal
arbitration.

Also as a non-criminal proceeding, the arbitration of the

charge against the grievant is not affected by the decision of the police
not to charge him with a crime.
That the Company work rules do not specifically prohibit "drug
dealing" is immaterial.

Clearly an employer may take steps to uncover,

eliminate and prevent drug use and drug dealings among its employees on
its premises and during working hours.

Setting aside one's personal views

about the use of undercover agents in carrying out those objectives, it is
well-settled
authority.

that

an employer may

do so as part of his managerial

Hence there was nothing violative of the contract or the

Company/Union relationship here by the Company's use of that procedure.
Though

the

Company has

certain

enumerated work

rules, it

nonetheless retained its managerial authority to discipline and discharge
employees for "proper cause."

"Proper Cause," as the general rule of the

work rules indicates, need not be limited to enumerated offenses.

A

"general rule" of this type is quite common in industrial relations as
part of promulgated work rules and is designed to and enforceable as a
retention of an
offenses

not

employers

otherwise

right to discipline and/or discharge for

enumerated, provided, of course,

that those

offenses meet the test of just or proper cause. With that right expressly
reserved, the contract reference to discussions with the Union on changes
in the work rules, is inapplicable.

There was neither an "addition" or an

amendment."
Therefore in this regard the issue is not whether the charge
gainst the grievant had to be among the enumerated offenses, but rather
nether standing alone, it constitutes "cause" for discharge within the
eaning of the "general rule."

Also, if the charge against the grievant meets the test of
proper cause for summary
iiscipline

is unnecessary.

dismissal,

the application

of

"progressive

As the parties well know,

"progressive

discipline" is relevant for offenses which standing alone are not serious
nough to justify immediate discharge.

But "progressive discipline" is

not a condition precedent to immediate discharge for a summary discharge
offense.
Here,

therefore,

the question

is not whether

"progressive

discipline" was or should have been administered, but rather whether the
grievant committed a summary dismissal offense.
That the grievant did not use drugs and was not "impaired" are
also immaterial.

He is not charged with those offenses.

against him is different.

The charge

It is "making a drug deal" and it is that

charge alone that must stand the test of just or proper cause.
Accordingly, the remaining and determinative issue is whether
the charge against the grievant constitutes "proper cause" for his summary
discharge.
I must conclude that it does.

He willingly and voluntarily on

Company premises and during working hours, arranged to sell a quantity of
narijuana.

That equates with "dealing in drugs."

That the actual sale

and transfer was to take place or took place later, off hours and outside
of the Company's premises, does not make it any less a transaction on
Company premises and during working hours.

In short, the prohibited

transaction began, was negotiated and agreed to on Company premises and
luring working hours.

Only its physical implementation was to be or was

)ff hours and off Company premises.

The beginnings, negotiations and agreement on Company premises
to sell a quantity of prohibited drugs is something that the Company has
the managerial authority to prohibit and prevent.

The safety and welfare

of its employees and the integrity of its products and reputation are as
much in jeopardy by the selling of drugs by its employees as the use of
drugs by employees.

And finally, as with drug use and impairment due to

drugs while on Company property and/or during working hours, transactions
or agreements to sell drugs engaged in at similar times, are dismissible
offenses.

That in this case the transaction was engaged in or structured

by the use of covert procedures unknown to the grievant, as debatable as
that may be in terms of social niceties, does not relieve the grievant of
is intention to commit that offense or his role in it.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator in the above
matter and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named
sarties, make the following AWARD:
There was just cause for the discharge of CHRISTOPHER
HOAGLIN.

Eric J. Schmertz, Arbitrator

DATED:

February 17, 1995

STATE OF NEW YORK

)

BOUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

ss:

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrator
:hat I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument,
/hich is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
EXPEDITED ARBITRATION
N THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
AWARD
Case # 13E-300-0068195

,OCAL 3 I.B.E.W.
and

OYNE ELECTRICAL CONTRACTORS, INC.
-X

The stipulated issue is:
Was the discharge of ROBERT KAUKARAS in violation of
Article XIII of the collective bargaining agreement?
If so, what shall the remedy be?

Coyne Electrical Contractors, Inc., hereinafter referred to as
the "Company" has not met its burden of establishing just cause for Mr.
<aukaras' discharge by the requisite clear and convincing standard.

The

allegations of Kaukaras' misconduct and his denials and explanations are
offsetting and hence indeterminative either way.

Also, the Company failed

to employ or follow the well-settled principle of "progressive discipline"
in that at no time did it confront, warn, discipline or otherwise put
<aukaras on notice that his job was in jeopardy because of the charges
against him advanced in this arbitration.
Accordingly,

Kaukaras' discharge

is reversed

and

shall be

sxpunged from his record.
However, other facts established at the hearing preclude his
reinstatement at this time to active employment or an Award of back pay.

The

Company

ontracts, thereby

has

shown

that

it has

substantially reducing

employees and resulting

lost

significant

the available work

in substantial employee layoffs.

work

for its

Indeed, the

number of employees in Kaukaras' classification have been reduced from
about 30 to about 3 or 4.
As a consequence it is unclear, and not established as part of
the record, whether Kaukaras, with relatively short term seniority, would
be able to claim

active

employment

at this time and, it is equally

unclear, and not established, when or whether if at all, he could have
made that claim during the period of his discharge.
Under these circumstances Kaurakas' proper present status shall
be that of a Company employee laid off under Article XIII, effective on or
about the date he was discharged.

If there be a short period of time

Between the date of his discharge and when work for him would no longer
have been available, any pay for that period is offset by his interim
employment at a Local 3 job at Bloomingdales.
If and when work which he can perform becomes available he shall
be considered

for recall and for employment by the Company under the

contract and industry recall procedures and practices.

Eric J. Schmertz, Arbitrator

DATED:

June 7, 1995

STATE OF NEW YORK

)

:OUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

ss:

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrator
that I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument,
rfhich is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,
ADMINISTRATOR
-X

N THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
OPINION AND AWARD

UE-GE NATIONAL CONFERENCE BOARD OF
HE INTERNATIONAL UNION OF ELECTRONIC,
ELECTRICAL, SALARIED, MACHINE AND
URNITURE WORKERS, AFL-CIO, LOCAL 707

CASE NO. 53 3000041694

and

GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY
-X

The stipulated issue is:
Did the Company violate Section 1, Article 4 of the
1991/1994

GE-IUE National Agreement?

If so, what

shall the remedy be?
Regardless of the determination of the above, was the
letter of reprimand and discharge of SPENCER PRIDE for
just cause?
A hearing was held on February 15, 1995 in Cleveland, Ohio, at
^hich time Mr.

Pride .hereinafter referred to as the

"grievant" and

representatives

of the above-named Union and Company appeared.

All

oncerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument
and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's

Oath was

waived; a stenographic record of the hearing was taken; and the parties
filed post-hearing briefs.
The Company charges the grievant with insubordination.

It

claims that on February 17, 1994 he refused to perform a work order to cut
ertain tubing; that that refusal led to the issuance of a letter of

reprimand to the grievant for insubordination.

(He had received a prior

letter of reprimand with a suspension in 1986 for "misoperation...causing
extensive

damage...endangering

(him)self

and others.")

And

that in

accordance with Company policy and rules, a second reprimand carries the
penalty of discharge.
The Union and the grievant deny that the grievant refused to
)erform the assignment.

They assert that as a Union steward, the grievant

questioned the propriety of the assignment (claiming it was outside of his
job classification) and that he intended to do the job "under protest"
following receipt of heat treatment for an injured shoulder, but found
upon completing that treatment that the job had been done by another
employee.
Based on the record before me, I find that the Company had just
and

reasonable

onstructively,

grounds

to

conclude

the

grievant

actually

or

Company's

In this proceeding the Union does not

general

policy

discharge upon a second reprimand.
offenses").

the

but willfully, refused to comply with the work order,

justifying the letter of reprimand.
challenge

that

of

imposing the

penalty of

(Reprimands are issued for "serious

It only challenges the propriety of the at issue reprimand.

My findings of fact are as follows:
1.

Upon instructions
Castelletti,

from manager of shop operations Mark

another

employee

(Willis

Mitchell)

was

instructed to cut certain tubing and was further instructed
to get the grievant to help him do so.

(It is undisputed

that two employees are needed to do the particular job).
2.

When Mitchell informed the grievant, the grievant sought a
meeting with Castelletti.

At

that

meeting,

followed

by

a

second

meeting

that

immediately followed and attended by the Union's Chief
Steward,

the

grievant

argued

first,

that

the

work

assignment was not part of his job classification; second
that he "would do it" (or "would not do it unless") he was
paid the higher job rate of a fabricator; third, that to
perform the work would be prejudicial to his productivity
record.
3.

When

the

foregoing

three

arguments

did

Castelletti to withdraw the work assignment

not persuade
(Castelletti

disputed the merits of each argument), the grievant then
stated

that

he had to get a heat

treatment

for his

shoulder, and left the meeting, to do so.
4.

Throughout the two meetings Castelletti repeatedly told the
grievant to perform the job as assigned and to grieve if he
thought the assignment was improper.

5.

Shortly after the grievant left the second meeting to get
a heat treatment at the medical department, Castelletti saw
him at his work station, approached him, and told him he
was being given a final chance to carry out the job
assignment, and that if he did not, he'd "be written up."

6.

Thereafter the grievant went for a heat treatment for his
shoulder.

During that period, Castelletti assigned the

tube cutting work to another employee (Ben Smith), who did
the work with Mitchell.

7.

The grievant completed the heat treatment at about 2:40
P.M.

The end of his shift was at 3:00 P.m.

undisputed

(It is

that the tube cutting assignment would have

taken from 20 minutes to 1/2 hour, and that employees are
entitled to a clean-up period before clocking out).
I need not decide whether the grievant overtly refused to
perform the job as assigned.
or confined.

A "refusal" need not be so precisely defined

A "refusal" can take the form of an unduly protracted

objection to the assignment; an unreasonable delay in performing the
assignment; non-urgent or non-compelling activities before getting to the
assignment, or intervening circumstances that delay or exhaust the time
available to perform the job.

Where these events or circumstances are

deemed to be resorted to or utilized in opposition to or to frustrate a
legitimate work order, a conclusion that the work order is being "refused"
is logical.

These latter circumstances are present in this case.

Based on the foregoing facts and the entire record including the
grievant's testimony, I am constrained

to conclude

that

because he

believed that the work assignment was not in his classification and
Decause he had previously orally grieved a similar assignment, he intended
not to perform it unless he was paid a higher rate.

And that when that

demand and his argument regarding "productivity" were unavailing, he
iecided to claim the need for medical treatment for his shoulder as an
ultimate factor to avoid compliance.

The record is clear that more than

once he was warned that if he did not comply he'd be "written up" (i.e.
lisciplined).

While there is no dispute that the grievant had been receiving
ieat treatment for his shoulder and that he did get treated on February
17th,

there is no evidence that he was scheduled

to do so at that

)articular time or evidence that having worked throughout the day up to
that point, the medical treatment was, coincidentally, compelling or
necessary at that moment.

I do not question the bonafide of the heat

treatment, but rather the need to have it done at that time.

Rather,

because he never mentioned either his shoulder paining him or the need for
leat treatment until his other claims were expressed and denied, I must
conclude that the heat treatment procedure was utilized by him for the
Durpose of and as a final effort to avoid doing the work ordered.
Indeed, his timing supports this conclusion.

He certainly

should have known, following the final discussion with Castelletti at his
place when Castelletti gave him "a final chance" to comply, that if
he went for heat treatment instead, Castelletti would get someone else to
do the work.

Additionally conclusive is the fact that the grievant's

biming was such that when he completed the heat treatment there was not
and would not have been enough time to do the job anyway.

At the risk of

larshness, I must conclude, considering the grievant's earlier resistance
to do the assignment, that he knew that to take the heat treatment at the
time he did would effectively make subsequent performance of the job
impossible.
None of the grievant's claims or complaints about the job
assignment, even assuming their bonafides, fall within the well-settled
exceptions to the basic rule "to comply and then grieve."

Nor, in my view, did the grievant's role as a steward give him
immunity.

Indeed to the contrary.

As a steward of some 10 years, he knew

and concedes he knew of the rule "comply and then grieve."

As a steward

had a special duty to follow that rule, especially, as here, where the
vork assignment was given to him in his capacity as an employee.

He had

the right to question the propriety of the order and the right to have a
meeting on it with Castelletti and with the Chief Steward.

But when told

directly to do the job and grieve, he should have complied without further
delay, leaving redress of his objections to the grievance procedure.

To

seek additional pay (even if ultimately warranted) and to decide to delay
getting to the work until after the heat treatment, was to improperly
ubstitute his judgement for that of management for what was to be done
and when and how it was to be done. At that point he went beyond his
authority

as a steward.

The Company's disciplinary

therefore because the grievant was a Union steward.

action was not
Hence, I find no

/iolation of Section 1, Article 4 of this contract.
As there is not challenge herein to the Company's procedure of
imposing the penalty of discharge for insubordination or for a second
reprimand, and in view of my finding that the grievant's second letter of
reprimand was for the offense of insubordination, the grievant's discharge
is sustained.

The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and having
uly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named parties, makes
the following AWARD:
The

Company did

not violate

Section

1, Article

4 of the

1991/1994 GE-IUE National Agreement.
The letter of reprimand and the discharge of SPENCER PRIDE was
for just cause.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED:

May 17, 1995

TATE OF NEW YORK

)
ss:

COUNTY OF NEW YORK )

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrator
that I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument,
is my AWARD.

.MERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,
DMINISTRATOR

-x
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
OPINION AND AWARD
Case No. 16E 3000027894

IUE, RADIO AND MACHINE WORKERS,
OCAL 161
and

GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY
-X

The stipulated issue is:
Whether the discharge of VIRGINIA CANDIS was for just
cause?

If not, what shall be the remedy?

A hearing was held on March 29, 1995 at which time Ms. Candis,
hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and representatives of the
above-named Union and Company appeared. All concerned were afforded full
opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and crossexamine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived, and the parties

filed post-hearing briefs.
The critical

questions

posed

in this

case

are whether

the

grievant falsified the medical and physical condition of her right arm by
claiming that intense and chronic pain in that arm virtually immobilized
its use on her job; whether she misled the physicians who examined and
treated her; and whether she claimed and received Workers Compensation and
accepted

medical treatment

fraudulently.

at

considerable

expense to

the Company,

I need not recite herein the extensive history of the grievant's
problems with her right arm beginning with a claimed work injury in July
989,

through

some

100 visits to the Company

clinic,

examinations,

liagnoses, and treatments by Doctors Mull, Sherman, Lamb and evaluations
nd therapy at the Lewis Gale Pain Center over approximately four years
rom 1989 to the grievant's discharge in October 21, 1993.

The record and

the briefs of the parties document that history fully, along with the
eriods of time that the grievant did not work because of the claimed
disability and the period of time she worked only part-time.
Suffice it to say that throughout she complained of and was
diagnosed with "excruciating" pain; inability to move the arm in any
normal way; (e.g. "can't lift a pencil or button clothes") intense pain on
:>eing touched; the need to carry the arm "as if it was in a sling," with
the hand more like a "claw."

She was medically diagnosed as suffering

rom "reflex sympathetic dystrophy," with "50% impairment."
With virtually no improvement (except some minor progress at the
Pain Clinic) over this extended period of time, and apparently because of
the grievant's

expressed desire to retire on disability, the Company,

suspicious of the bonafides of her claimed condition, secretly video taped
ler off the job.

These tapes showed circumstances vastly different from

ier claimed disability generally, vastly different specifically from her
:laimed inability to perform her job (as an operator who placed PROMS,
weighing one ounce each and measuring an inch square, in a small box) and
'inconsistent" with the complaints and symptoms she continued to report to
the doctors and the Company's medical department.

The video taping took

)lace on June 6, July 6 and 7, September 17, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23 and 24,
L993.

There is no evidence that the tapes are not authentic or that they

-/ere edited or otherwise selective.

The tapes showed the grievant using her right arm, apparently
unimpaired,

doing

such

things

as moving

and

dismantling

furniture,

carrying groceries and other packages, opening and closing doors, loading
the rear of an automobile, swinging a pocketbook over her right shoulder,
lifting cartons of soft drinks, folding an umbrella, shaking out laundry
and hanging wash on a clothes line.

The physicians who had examined,

diagnosed and treated her over the four year period, testified at the
rearing, that upon seeing the tapes, they concluded that her ability to do
these things off the job was "totally inconsistent" with her reports and
omplaints to them, inconsistent with their diagnosis of her condition (at
least by the time the video was taken), and that they concluded that the
grievant "misled them."

They answered "no" to the arbitrator's question

of whether there could be a difference between the demands of and tensions
on the job, as distinguished from her off the job activities, that would
account for the marked difference in the use of her right arm.
The Union argues that video tapes alone, without further medical
examinations of the grievant, are not sufficient to nullify the several
ears of medical diagnosis and treatment made and accorded by the doctors.
And that the later testimony of the doctors that they were "misled" should
not be accepted by the arbitrator as sufficiently probative to support an
abrupt and "late switch" in the diagnosis, especially when the grievant
•/as not again examined and the new opinions regarding her condition (or
noncondition) were based on the video-tapes alone.
Though it does not affect the outcome of this case (because
other evidence in the record is adequately supportive of my decision) I
nt to, at this point, reverse an evidentiary
learing.

ruling I made at the

I admitted into evidence a video tape of the grievant working at

ler job in the plant.

(Company Exhibit 24).

I did so before the cross-

xamination of the Company nurse.

In her cross-examination, however, she

cknowledged that that tape was made for "ergonomic" purposes.
On March 15, 1991, the Union and the Company agreed in writing
and signed by William C. Martin, the Company's Safety Specialist) that
apes taken for "ergonomic" evaluations "will not be used to discipline
employees."

Here, obviously Company Exhibit 24 was

introduced into

evidence to show the grievant's severely restricted use of her right arm
hile on the job and to be compared with the off-the-job tapes showing
lormal use of that arm.

As such, its purpose in this arbitration is to

support the Company's conclusion that the grievant falsified her condition
and to support the Company's action discharging her.
las been introduced "to discipline" the grievant.
the March 15, 1991 agreement.

Clearly, thus, it

That is a violation of

That technically, it was made by the

medical department and not the Safety Department, I consider immaterial.
Its use here to support a disciplinary penalty is a breach of the spirit
and intent of the March 15, 1991 agreement.

Therefore, I exclude it.

However, this ruling notwithstanding, there is other substantial
evidence in the record that discloses how the grievant did her job with
ier claimed disability and the virtual uselessness of her arm when doing
so.

Therefore, the comparisons between her claimed inability to use the

arm normally on the job and her flexible use of the arm off the job can be
ompared by this other probative evidence.
I do not agree with the Union that the testimony by the doctors
at the hearing changing their diagnosis of the grievant's condition should
not be accorded credit in view of their long-term diagnosis and treatment
the grievant otherwise.
They gave their medical opinions on the grievant's condition
Dased on the tapes, and compared medically what they saw she was capable

of during off the job with her complaints and symptoms on the job when she
as examined.

I cannot conclude that their conclusions based on that

omparison, in the absence of rebuttal medical testimony, were not rooted
in medical expertise.
It is well known that pain is a subjective symptom.

Doctors

make a diagnosis of pain and related symptoms based largely on what the
patient reports.

Objective

evaluations, based on x-rays,

and other

scientific techniques do not usually disclose pain.
That being so, I reach the following conclusions.
reason to disbelieve that the grievant's
accident.

I find no

condition originated with an

I see no reason to disbelieve that for some time she suffered

extensive pain and was effectively disabled (including possibly up to
50%).

I have no guarrel with the operation performed on her arm and the

iiagnosis which prompted it. Nor do I have any reason to believe that the
grievant did not at some point and for some period suffer from "reflex
sympathetic dystrophy."
In short, for some undefined period of time, I conclude, in the
absence of evidence to the contrary, that her claim of pain and disability
and her entitlement to workers compensation and medical treatment were
legitimate.
But at some point, I conclude, her condition if not totally
cured,

improved

substantially.

That occurred

some

time

before and

?robably well before the video taping of her off the job activities.

Just

cannot be determined from this record.
I reach this conclusion not only on the video tapes of her offthe-job activities, but also on a well-settled rule of evidence.
the

Company

has

the

burden

in this case

of proving

cause

Though
for the

jrievant's discharge, the burden of proof shifts to the grievant when and

fter the Company has made out a prima facie case.

The Company did so

ith the video tapes of the grievant's off the job activities, together
ith the new diagnoses of the doctors based on their observations of the
apes.

Shown prima facie, is that regardless of the possible bonafides of

he grievant's original accident and resultant condition for a period of
ime, there came a point when the grievant was rehabilitated, at least to
he extent that she should have been able to do her job normally.

At that

oint, the burden of proof shifted to the grievant to show, medically
psychologically, or otherwise that there were differences between her job
nd her off the job activities which would explain or rebut what the tapes
howed and the prima facie conclusions drawn therefrom.

The grievant and

.he Union on her behalf did not assume or meet this shift in the burden.
'o the tapes and the

later medical evaluations by the doctors stand

nrefuted, with the Company's burden of proof met.
At some point, the grievant knew that her condition had improved
substantially, and that her off the job apparently unrestricted use of her
rm could have been applied to her job duties as well.

At that point, she

lad the duty not only to no longer claim the disability but to commence
erforming her job duties with the normal use of her arm.
ind for the period

she did not do so,

(and I conclude

To the extent
it was for a

ignificant period) she falsified her condition to the Company, continued
to take benefits
ntitled.

That

and seek accommodations

to which

she was no longer

falsification constitutes a substantial

and willful

violation of an express company rule against "falsification of records"
and I cannot find that under the circumstances

and absent mitigating

factors, the penalty of discharge was either unjustified or too harsh.
I recognize the theoretical possibility that for psychological
reasons alone, the grievant may not have been able to use her arm on the

ob but could use it off the job.

But no evidence in support of that

possibility was adduced in rebuttal to the Company's case.

If such a

peculative possibility is deemed to be a mitigating factor, warranting
the grievant's reinstatement on condition she perform her job regularly
nd without any show or claim of disability, that is for the Company to
consider and is not within the scope of the evidence in this arbitration.
However, the grievant's own testimony suggests otherwise.

At

the hearing she stated that her arm had improved considerably and that she
vas now able to work normally.

That acknowledgement comes too late.

To

me it means that much earlier her arm had improved, but that she failed to
tell

the

Company,

continuing

rather

to

falsely

perpetuate

misrepresentation until faced with discharge and this proceeding.

the
Also,

that she thinks she is now capable of working without restrictions belies
any suggestion that the job presents "psychological" problems to her that
are not present when she is off the job.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and having
duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named parties, makes
the following AWARD:

The discharge of Virginia Candis was for just cause.

Eric J. Schmertz, Arbitrator
)ATED:

May 30, 1995

TATE OF NEW YORK

)

:OUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

ss:

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrator
that I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument,
is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,
ADMINISTRATOR
N THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
INTERNATIONAL UNION OF ELECTRONIC,
LECTRICAL, SALARIED, MACHINE AND
URNITURE WORKERS, AFL-CIO
UE LOCAL 1160

OPINION AND AWARD
CASE # 56 300 000 1594

and

GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY
-X

The stipulated issue is:
Did the Company violate Article XI of the 1991-1994
GE-IUE National Agreement or the Local Layoff and
Recall Supplement on November 3, 1992, when DALE
WITZMAN was recalled from layoff to the Inspect and
Test "A" Classification rather than KEN DZWONKOWSKI?
If so, what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held in Eveleth, Minnesota on December 14, 1994 at
time Mr. Dzwonkowski, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and
representatives of the above-named

Union and Company

appeared.

All

concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument
and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was

waived; a stenographic record of the hearing was taken, and the parties
filed post-hearing briefs.
In my judgement the facts and circumstances of this case warrant
the application of the legal principle of "reformation" (i.e. to conform
the technical circumstances to the substantive facts) and calls for a
lecision that is both equitable and contractual.

Article XI reads:
1.

REDUCTION OR INCREASE IN FORCES
Whenever there is a reduction in the
working force or employees are laid off
from their regular jobs, total length of
continuous service applied on a plant,
department, or other as negotiated locally,
shall be the major factor determining the
employees to be laid off or transferred
(exclusive of upgrading or transfers to
higher rated jobs). However, ability will
be given consideration.
Similarly, in all cases of rehiring after
layoff, total length of continuous service
applied on a plant, department, or other
basis as negotiated locally, shall be the
major factor covering such rehiring if the
employee is able to do the available work
in a satisfactory manner after a minimum
amount of training. (JTX 1)

The Layoff and Recall Supplement reads:
2.

RECALL FROM PERMANENT LAYOFF PROCEDURE
(A)

Total
length
of
continuous
service as defined in Section
l(a) shall be the major factor
governing
rehiring,
if
the
employee is able to do the
available work in a satisfactory
manner after a minimum amount of
training not to exceed one (1)
week. Every effort will be made
to place laid off or downgraded
employees on their former jobs.
No new employees will be hired in
a job classification until all
laid off qualified employees have
had an opportunity to return to
work.

(B)

Downgraded employees will be
returned to their former job
classification and rates whenever
sufficient
work
in
their
classifications becomes available
on the basis of their total
length of continuous service and
continued ability.

Prior to November 2, 1992 both the grievant and Dale Witzman
on layoff.

It is undisputed that both had served actively in the

classification, Inspect and Test "A" and were qualified to perform the
duties of that classification.

The grievant enjoyed greater seniority.

The Company's recall of Witzman, the junior of the two, to the
Inspect and Test "A" classification prompted the instant grievance.
If Witzman's recall to that classification involved also the
assignment to him of the duties of that classification, the Company's
action would clearly violate the recall provisions of the contract.

The

grievant, as the senior of the two was "able to do the available work in
a satisfactory manner..."and therefore was entitled to recall preference.
But there

is more to the relevant facts.

Witzman, though

lassified as Inspect and Test "A" was not assigned to the duties of that
classification, but rather to work within the classification Electric
Mechanic, Group A (also referred to as Electromechanic).
More specifically, Witzman was recalled and assigned to perform
'wheel motor work."
The Company asserts that no Electromechanics were on layoff at
the time; that Witzman had been a "GE Electromechanic and had extensive
experience on the types of wheel motors involved"; that the grievant was
not so-experienced or qualified; that it would have taken him not the
contractual "one week"- to learn the job, but rather "three months"; and
that Witzman was accorded the title Inspect and Test "A" upon recall
Because, as a small and informal shop, it was the practice to "carry" a

ecalled employee "on the books" in his former classification.
to "declassify"

Witzman to the lower rated Electromechanic

And that
job would

result in a reduction in pay contrary to the Company's agreement with him
/hen he was offered the recall.
Simply, it is the Company's position that the "available work"
/ithin the meaning of the Recall Supplement was wheel motor repair within
the Electromechanic classification and that Witzman was qualified to do it
and the grievant was not.

Hence, concludes the Company, the Witzman

recall in preference to a recall of the grievant was contractually proper.
The Union asserts that the definition of "available work" is the
ob classification to which an employee on layoff is recalled — here, the
ob of Inspect and Test "A."

And that having so identified and focused

the recall notice on that classification, the Company is so bound.

It

concludes therefore that the grievant, qualified in that classification
and with greater seniority, should have been recalled. /My interpretation
of the Union's argument is that if the Company erred with regard to the
actual work to which the recall employee would be assigned, it made that
error at its peril and cannot deny the recall as mandated by the contract
to the classification the Company selected.
Alternatively, the Union contends that by skills he already
possessed from the higher rated job of Inspect and Test "A," and from
courses he has taken, the grievant is able to perform the wheel motor work
involved, and certainly after a week's training.
Based on the record before me, I cannot disagree with the
Company's position that the grievant is not now qualified to perform the
motor repair.
so with training

Nor can I conclude that he would be capable of doing

of one week.

I accept the Company's judgement and

testimony on that point. Therefore, though the grievant is highly skilled

and talented as an Inspect and Test "A" and though he is to be commended
on his educational initiatives, I am not persuaded that he is yet able to
step into the work of wheel motor repair and do it satisfactory as
contractually prescribed.
Nonetheless,

the

Company

committed

certain

procedural

and

contractual errors which cannot stand with impunity, and the effects of
compel an equitable remedy.
There is no serious dispute that the work the Company wanted and
needed to have performed when it initiated the recall was wheel motor
epair.

There is no evidence that it intended to assign the recalled

employee to work in the Inspect and Test "A" classification and then
shift, later, to wheel motor repair.

But, though it acted in good faith

in that regard, it nonetheless purposefully noticed the recall for the
classification.
Also, by retaining Witzman in the higher job classification of
Inspect and Test "A," though it was intended all along that he be assigned
to specialized duties in the lower rated job of Electromechanic, was not
only

contractually

erroneous,

albeit

beneficial

to

Witzman,

but

perpetuated mis-information to the grievant and the Union.
The

foregoing

prompts

this

blunt

analysis.

Willfully or

inadvertently, the Company's procedural error misled the Union and the
grievant.

At the time of the recall, and probably until the first

grievance meeting was held, the Union and the grievant had legitimate
grounds to believe that the Company violated the recall provisions of the
ontract.
Under the facts of this case, where it is clear that the work
for which the recall was intended was wheel motor repair (and within a
lifferent classification than the job of the recall notice) I am not

prepared to unrealistically conclude that the "available work" within the
contractual meaning was work in the Inspect and Test "A" classification.
So the Union's claim in that regard is rejected.

But, on equitable

grounds I do conclude that for a period of time, again, namely from the
recall of Witzman until the Union knew what the "available work" was in
fact, the Union and the grievant had reason to believe that the "available
i/\rork" was work for which the grievant was qualified and to which he was
entitled based on his seniority.

Under that circumstance, I conclude that

:he Company must bear some financial responsibility for its contractual
•error," for the misleading effect it had on the Union and the grievant,
and for its disregard of what would appear to be the grievant's rights
under the contract.
Also

because

it

is

part

and

parcel

of

the

same recall

•transaction" and because of its misleading nature, I conclude that it is
within my authority to conform the facts of the Witzman recall to the
spirit if not the requirements of the contract.
Specifically, so that the recall and other relevant provisions
of the contract are upheld and enforced, Witzman's status

should be

conformed to the classification in which he is actually working, at the
rate of pay of that classification.

Based on the foregoing particular facts and circumstances of
this case, the Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and having
duly heard the proof and allegation of the above-named parties, makes the
following AWARD:
The recall of Dale Witzman is upheld.
However, for the contractual errors committed by the
Company in noticing and implementing that recall, the
Company is directed to pay Ken Dzwonkowski an amount
of money equivalent to what he would have earned at
straight time as an Inspect and Test "A" for the
period from the recall of Witzman to when the Company
notified

the

Union that

Witzman's

perform wheel motor repair

recall

was

to

(in the classification

Electromechanic) but no later than the date of the
first step of the grievance procedure of the instant
grievance.
Prospectfully, Witzman shall be reclassified as an
Electromechanic

and

paid

at

the

rate

of

that

classification, unless the Union and the Company agree
otherwise on his classification and rate of pay.

E"ric/3r. "schmertz,Arbitrator
DATED:

March 20, 1995

STATE OF NEW YORK

)

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

ss:

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Impartial
Chairman that I am the individual described in and who executed this
instrument, which is my AWARD.

.w
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In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 702 Motion Picture
Laboratory Film Technicians
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AND

AWARD

and
Guffanti Film Laboratories, Inc.

The stipulated issues are:
1)

Did the Employer violate Article 1,
Subsections a, b and f, Article 7
and Schedule A of the Collective Bargaining Agreement by laying off Robert
Moran from his position as a Projectionist on or about March 31, 1995?
If so, what shall be the remedy?

2)

Did the Employer violate the same contract sections and also Article 16 of
the contract by assigning the projectionist work to Supervisors? If so,
what shall be the remedy?

A hearing was held on September 12, 1995 at which time Mr.
Moran, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and
representatives of the above-named Union and Employer appeared.
All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The

Arbitrator's Oath was waived.
The stipulated issues are interrelated and can be dealt with
together.
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The contract sections cited by the Union in its grievance and
in the stipulated issues notwithstanding, the facts in this case
are controlled by the first paragraph of Section 7 and Section
7(a) of the contract.

It reads:

When work is insufficient to provide a full
week's employment for all employees of a
department layoffs may be effected in any one
of the following methods:
The available work shall be rotated in the
first instance amongst the qualified employees
within the particular classification affected,
and then, if necessary, among the qualified employees within the particular classification
affected, and then, if necessary, among the
qualified employees in the department at the
wage rates of work performed so as to afford at
least three days work per week for the employees
affected. Thereafter, should such work distribution result in less than three days work per
distribution result in less than three days work
per work for such employees of said department,
or should such work provide not more than three
days work per week for a period of six successive
weeks, layoffs in such department may, at the
option of the Employer, be effected as hereinafter
provided, under subdivisions (1) (2), (3), (4) and
(5) of (c) hereof.
The unrefuted evidence adduced by the Company is that the
projectionist work performed by the grievant had fallen to three
hours a day.

Absent evidence to the contrary I conclude that means

that the total amount of projectionist work in the laboratory was
three hours a day.

As the grievant was the only employee in the
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department and the only employee "particular(ly) classif(ied)" as a
"Projectionist," there were no other employees within the meaning
of Section 7 (a) amongst whom the work could be "rotated."

More-

over, rotation of three hours of work a day "amongst qualified employees" would not produce at least "three days work per week for
such employees," even if others, outside of the department were
included.
In short, Section 7 allows for layoffs when there is a diminution of work below a "full week's employment," and sets forth the
procedures to be followed, the notice to be given and certain
payments to be made.
There is no dispute that the grievant was laid off because
of the sharp reduction in his work as a Projectionist, and that he
was offered, but refused to accept the two weeks wages required by
Section 7(c).
It is well settled that a specific, relevant section of a
contract takes precedent over other general provisions.

According-

ly, as is traditional under collective bargaining agreements, an explicit provision for layoffs because of a diminution of available
work preempts the general Shop Agreement (Article 1) or the Classification of Work and Rates (Schedule A).

Neither of the foregoing

provisions (or subsections thereof), restrict the Employer's right
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under Section 7, to effectuate lay-offs for lack of work. With that
foregoing interpretation of Section 7, there is no basis to find
any Section 7 violation.

The Union complains further that the grievant's remaining
projectionist work was assigned to non-bargaining unit
Supervisors and other bargaining unit employees not of the Projectionist classification.

The record shows that the remaining

three hours a day of projectionist work was parcelled out to a
bargaining unit Timer and a Mechanic and possibly, at nights,
to a Supervisor.
I cannot find this arrangement as it involved a Timer to
be a violation of the contract, not only because the grievant's
layoff was permitted by Article 7, but also because the record
shows that the projectionist work and the use of the projector
has not been exclusively that of the bargaining unit Projectionist.
The well settled rule prohibiting the assignment of bargaining unit work to non-bargaining unit personnel or to bargaining
unit employees of other classifications requires a showing that
the work has been exclusively performed by a particular classification, here the Projectionist.
That requisite exclusivity has not been shown.

Indeed, on

a regular basis, on the night shift, for example, the same work
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performed by the grievant, was performed by Supervisor Jack
Harrell.Also, during the grievant's employment, the use of a
projector to check quality, color, etc., was regularly done by
Timers. Though the quality control exercised by the Projectionist
and the Timers were different in detail there is a sufficient
similarity in the use of the projector (normal and high speed
projection)

and the purposes of that use (quality control) to

negate any claim of exclusivity by the projectionist.
So, in the absence of a showing of exclusivity, I find no
contractual fault to the assignment of some of the remaining
hours of the grievant's work to the Timer.
Nor is this inconsistent with my Decision in Local 702,
I.A.T.S.E. -and- TVC and Precision Laboratories. (September 17,
1991).

The Union's reliance on that Decision is misplaced.

is significantly distinguishable from the instant case.

It

In TVC

I reversed the layoff of James Garrett, a Raw Stock Splicer, who
was laid off because of a "diminution of work in that classification."

There, unlike the instant case, I "(did) not find any

diminution of work which would justify the grievant's layoff." I
found that his work, in full quantity, was being performed by
other employees.
Here, the Employer has shown a substantial diminution in the
grievants' work.

That is a material difference from the record
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in TVC.
Also, in TVC, the employer offered no evidence to show that
the Raw Stock Splicer did not have "exclusivity" over the work in
question.

In the instant case however, the Employer did show

that projectionist work or the use of the projector for quality
control was not the function of the Projectionist, exclusively.

In short, those two major differences between TVC and the
instant case, make TVC inapposite to the present issues.
However, the assignment of the work to a Mechanic and to a
Supervisor, cannot be sanctioned under the contract or the
foregoing arbitral rule.
The record does not show that operating a projector for
purposes of quality control has been regularly assigned to the
Mechanic.

He relates to the projector for mechanical purposes.

He "stands by it while it runs," apparently to repair it if
necessary,

but there is insufficient evidence that he operates

it or operates it for a quality control purpose.
The assignment of Projectionist bargaining unit duties no
matter how small in quantity, to a Supervisor is violative of
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Section 16(a) of the contract.

That Section, which is explicit

and unambiguous, takes precedent over any practice to the contrary.

It reads:
"Supervisory employees who are not classified
as Working Foremen or Sub-Foremen shall not
engage in production or perform the work of
another employee except insofar as such work
may be incidental to their duties."

Night shift projectionist work performed by a Supervisor,
is not "incidental" to his supervisory duties.

And a subsequent

assignment of those duties, after the grievant's layoff, is also
not incidental to his supervisory function.
Expressly and impliedly the Employer argues that the distribution of the grievant's remaining work to the Mechanic and to
a Supervisor, (and in theory to other classifications other than
Timers),is authorized by a Memorandum of Agreement dated December
27, 1985 between the Employer and the Union.

The Employer

asserts that in exchange for wage increases, contributions to
benefit funds, a promise of no layoffs and other benefits, the
Union accorded the Employer "flexibility in making work
assignments."

And that this "flexibility" was more precisely

defined in a December 20th, 1985 letter signed by Paul Guffanti,
Jr. of the Employer and C. W. Vitello, the then business agent of
the Union. That letter stated:
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"Our Lab's present need for flexibility is
limited to the Developing Department. However, because of technicological changes
or changes in the nature of our business,
it may be necessary in the future to make
changes in other areas in order to remain
competitive. None of these changes will
diminish the job security guarantees in
the Memorandum of Agreement."
The Employer explains that the foregoing agreement was
entered into because of the extreme competitiveness of the
industry, and that without it then and now, the Employer, faced
with sharp reductions in laboratory work, would be unable to remain in business.

It appeals to the Arbitrator to apply this

agreement to the facts in the instant case and uphold the distribution of the projectionist duties to other classifications and to
supervision, in recognition of the Employer's desperate efforts
to "hang on" to his business.
The only question within the Arbitrator's limited jurisdiction to interprete and apply the contract, is whether the
aforesaid Memorandum is applicable to this case. Matters of
economic survival, not controlled by the contract, are for discussion and negotiations between the parties, and not within the
authority of the Arbitrator, no matter how sympathetic he may be
personally to the Employers economic adversity.

In short, if

what the Employer has done is violative of the contract, I must
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reverse it, regardless of its economic consequences.

And if

consistent with the contract, it will be sustained.
For two reasons I do not find this Memorandum of Agreement
to be applicable.

First, it was part of a contract renewed in

1985, and was consideration for wage and benefit improvements
then.

There is no evidence that it was continued as part of sub-

sequent contracts or as part of subsequent contract extensions.
In short, it was a term and condition of the contract negotiated
in 1985; it was companion to the other conditions of employment
negotiated and in effect then; and, absent evidence to the
contrary, expired with the expiration of that contract.

I take

arbitral notice of the fact that in one form or another,
contracts subsequent to the one negotiated in 1985 were agreed to
by the parties.

So, unless this specific Memorandum was extended

as part of those subsequent agreements, it has expired.
Secondly, by its specific terms, it guarantees no layoffs.
It states:
"In order to enhance the job security of all
present employees, the Employer agrees that
during the term of this Agreement there shall
be no reductions in force. Except for attrition, there shall be no layoffs of such
employees...(emphasis added)"

Here, the grievant was laid off.
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If the Memorandum is still in effect, the grievant could be
viewed as a "present employee" within the meaning of the
guarantee. His layoff therefore would have been precluded and
should be voided. If "present employee" applied only to those
employed in 1985 when that contract was negotiated,its nonapplication now to the grievant adds further to a conclusion that
it was intended for the term of the 1985 contract.

And that the

present inapplicability of the job security guarantee, a major
consideration is evidence of the expiration of the entire
Memorandum.
For those reasons, I find the 1985 Memorandum is no longer
in effect, and hence not a defense to the Company's actions.
The conclusions derived from all the foregoing are apparent.
The Employer had the contractual right to lay off the grievant because the quantity of the available projectionist work fell below the
minimum of Section 7.

Based on the absence of exclusivity the Employer

had the right to assign the small quantity of remaining work to
Timer(s) who had previously performed work on the projector for quality
control.

But the Employer did not have the contractual right to assign

the work to a Mechanic(s) or to a non-bargaining unit Supervisor.
The Undersigned, Permanent Arbitrator under the collective
bargaining agreement between the above-named parties and having duly
heard the proofs and allegations of said parties, make the following
AWARD:

-11-

Provided the amount of available projectionist work in the Laboratory fell to
three hours a day, the Employer did not
violate the collective bargaining agreement by laying-off Robert Moran.
The Employer did violate the collective
bargaining agreement by assigning any of
the remaining three hours a day of projec
tionist work to Supervisor(s) and to a
Mechanic(s).
The Employer is directed to cease and desist from assigning that projectionist work
to Supervisor(s) and/or Mechanic(s).

Eric J. Schmertz
Permanent Arbitrator
DATE: September 22, 1995
STATE OF
New York)
COUNTY OF

New York)SS:.

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.
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In the Matter of the Arbitration
between

:NTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF
1LECTRICAL WORKERS, LOCAL 455

OPINION AND AWARD

and

HOLYOKE WATER POWER COMPANY
-X

The stipulated issue is:
Did the Company have proper cause to terminate the
employment of JAMES PHELAN on or about June 7, 1994?
If not, what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held in Holyoke, Massachusetts on November 29,
1994 at which time Mr. Phelan, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant"
and representatives of the above-named Union and Company appeared.

All

concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument
and to examine and cross examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was

waived and the parties filed post hearing briefs.
The grievant was discharged pursuant to the Company's Fitness
for Duty Policy

(NUP90) for testing positive a second time for use of

cocaine.
The Union challenges the policy generally as unreasonable, and,
specifically, contends its application to the grievant was unreasonable
and therefore his discharge should be nullified.

The pertinent parts of the Fitness for Duty Policy read:
1.

Policy
The Company recognizes that employees who are impaired by
any cause — mental or emotional; fatigue and stress, but
particularly by on-site or off-site use or abuse of
controlled substances or alcohol that may adversely affect
their ability to perform their duties — may create an
increased risk to their own safety, the safety of other
employees, and the safety of the public.
Further, the
Company acknowledges that its ability to safely and
efficiently
carry
out
its
responsibilities
while
maintaining the public's confidence can be seriously
jeopardized by employees whose safe performance is impaired
by any cause. Accordingly, the Company is committed to:
Ensuring that the work environment
productive, and healthy;

is safe,

Ensuring that employees perform their work
assignments in a reliable, trustworthy manner
and are not under the influence of alcohol,
illegal drugs, prescriptions
or "over the
counter" drugs, or are not impaired by mental or
emotional problems, fatigue, or stress;
Providing
reasonable
measures
for
early
detection of individuals who are not fit to
perform their duties; and
Maintaining an alcohol and drug free workplace
that
is free from the effects
of such
substances.
Employee Assistance Program
9.

The Company recognizes that alcohol and/or drug abuse may
require treatment and rehabilitation. Employees who have
an alcohol or drug abuse problem should be referred to the
Company's Employee Assistance Program.

10.

Employees who have an alcohol or drug abuse problem and who
ask for help should be referred to the Company's Employee
Assistance Program, immediately. A request for assistance,
or participation in the Employee Assistance Program, may
not be used by an employee as a means of avoiding
disciplinary action when a violation of the Fitness of Duty
policy is indicated.

11.

Employees who have tested positive for alcohol or drugs for
the first time will be referred to the Company's Employee
Assistance Program.

i

Management Actions and Sanctions
21.

Violation of any provision or requirement of this policy
may constitute a "for-cause" situation and may result in
disciplinary action up to and including discharge.

25.

Employees who have been removed from activities because of
fitness for duty impairment may be returned only after the
Company physician determines their fitness for duty.

26.

Lacking any other evidence, a positive test result will be
presumed to be an indication of off-site drug or alcohol
use and may result in referral to the Employee Assistance
Program, other
appropriate resources,
removal from
assignments consistent with regulatory requirements and
Company policy, and disciplinary action as appropriate.
a.

Removal from one's assignment for a first
positive test will be for a minimum of 14 days.
Employees will be placed on paid medical leave
contingent upon (1) compliance with the course
of action recommended by the Employee Assistance
Program and medical staff and (2) sufficient
paid sick time is available to cover the period
of absence.

b.

~\.

Any

Should circumstances warrant, employees removed
from their jobs may be subject to disciplinary
action.
Such action could be applied at the
same time as medical leave and therefore affect
one's pay status while on such leave.
subsequent positive test will result in
discharge.
The parties stipulated that on April 21, 1994 the Company had

'reasonable suspicion to have the grievant drug/alcohol tested" and that
on that date he "reported to work unfit for duty under the influence of
alcohol and drugs."

A test of the grievant's urine was positive for

cocaine.
Before the test results were known, the grievant entered an inpatient detoxification program (Spectrum) and remained in that program the
required five to seven days until May 4, 1994. Apparently he pursued that
treatment properly.

Thereafter, upon registering with the Company's

mployee Assistance Program, and upon direction from Spectrum and the EAP
he was told to enter an out-patient rehabilitation program at Holyoke
Hospital.

The grievant did so but not before May 16th.
On May 9th, the grievant met with the Company's Medical Review

Officer, and was told his positive test was "a first positive" under the
itness for Duty Policy and "that a second positive would place his job in
leopardy."

At that time he was placed on paid medical leave of absence.
The grievant attended the Holyoke Hospital program from the

evening of May 16th through May 25th.

He tested positive for cocaine use

on May 18th and 20th, and beginning with May 23rd, began to miss scheduled
sessions.

It is undisputed that during this period of rehabilitation

treatment, the grievant continued to use cocaine, including an admission
of use on May 24th.

At about this latter time the grievant was expelled

from the Holyoke Hospital program for his failure to follow the prescribed
schedule of treatment.
With that expulsion, the Company discontinued his paid status.
On May 31st the grievant was called into the Company's Medical
Office for a "return to work" examination and evaluation.
Medical Officer that he had used cocaine on May 24th.
responded

that

if the grievant was tested

that

He told the

The Medical Officer
day, he would test

positive, as cocaine probably would still be in his system from May 24th.
The Medical Officer gave the grievant the option of being tested then, or
to wait to be tested until June 2nd.

The grievant elected the latter.

The test of the grievant's urine on June 2nd was again positive
for the use of cocaine.- He was then discharged pursuant to Section 26(c)
of the Fitness for Duty Policy, which provides:
"Any

subseguent

discharge."

positive

test

will

result

in

The Union claims that the Fitness for Duty Policy should be
nullified as unreasonable because it was unilaterally promulgated by the
Company and not negotiated with or agreed to by the Union.
Whether the Company had the duty to bargain with the Union on
the Fitness for Duty Policy, and whether, if so, that duty was met, is not
within the jurisdiction of the Arbitrator.

That is a legal issue under

the National Labor Relations Act, and within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the National Labor Relations Board.
The Arbitrator's authority, as I see it, is to determine if the
Policy meets the test of an enforceable work rule under the collective
bargaining agreement, and I shall limit my analysis to that, regardless of
whether the Company installed the policy unilaterally as a work rule or as
a condition of employment following an impasse in negotiations.
A managerially legislated work rule is proper and enforceable if
it is employment related, adequately noticed and publicized, uniformly
enforced and if reasonable.

Here there is no real dispute over its

Legitimate relation to the employment setting in protecting the safety,
morale, productivity and discipline of the work force, nor is there any
question that the policy (NUP90) was well-publicized to the employees.
Also, its uniform enforcement is not questioned in this proceeding.

What

is challenged by the Union is its reasonableness.
To judge its reasonableness, generally, a more detailed look at
its provisions and practices is warranted.
Clearly, the Policy is both rehabilitative and disciplinary. It
does not mandate discharge (or even discipline) for the first positive
test for drug use.

Though Section 26(b) reserves to the Company the right

take disciplinary

action "at the same time as the medical leave,"

Section 26(a), immediately preceding, makes clear that discipline will not

be taken during the paid medical leave, so long as the affected employee
is in "compliance with the course of action recommended by the Employee
ssistance

Program

and medical staff."

So, the emphasis, at least

initially, is on rehabilitation, with discipline and discharges coming
into play if the employee fails to comply with the treatment regime, and
under Section 26(c)) if he again tests positive.
Against

a

backdrop

of

the

well-accepted

prerogative

of

management, generally, to discipline and discharge for a first positive
est for drug use, I must view. as liberal and enlightened an employer
jolicy, which as here, establishes an Employee Assistance Program to
assist in rehabilitation and which gives an employee a "second chance"
before facing dismissal.
Moreover, the Company's policy is additionally beneficial to the
imployee by continuing his pay during the treatment period and according
the use of sick time for that purpose.
Nor do I find the "minimum of 14 days" removal from active
employment to be unfair.

The record shows that paid leaves extended well

beyond

long

that

period,

so

as the

affected

employee

was

pursuing

treatment satisfactorily.
Under these general provisions, application and practice, I find
no basis to find the Policy per se, to be unreasonable.
The narrower and more precise question in this case, is whether
the application of the Policy to the grievant was unreasonable.
The Union contends that it was unreasonable for the Company not
to let the grievant complete his program of rehabilitation before testing
him on June 2nd.

The Union contends that it was unreasonable and in

violation of the Policy to test the grievant before he actually returned
to work.

The Union contends it was unreasonable not to give the grievant

an ultimatum" that he "return to work by a date certain, fit for duty, or
suffer termination."

The Union contends it was unreasonable for the

Company to determine that the June 2nd positive test was due to continued
use of cocaine by the grievant after May 24th.

And the Union contends it

unreasonable not to put the grievant, for the full period of his
Described treatment, in what

is acknowledged

as the most

effective

methodology of therapy, namely in an in-patient facility.
In considering these contentions, I must again make reference to
the arbitrator's limited authority.
determinations

of what

My authority does not extend to

I personally view would have been the most

humanitarian, benevolent or even effective way of handling the grievant's
erious and unfortunate drug addiction. Rather, my authority is confined
:o determining whether the Company's actions and the application of its
Policy were unreasonable.

I do not decide if or whether the Company could

have been more supportive, indulgent, or magnanimous in dealing with the
grievant's problem or whether optimally, there may have been a better
method of treating him.
The Company did not terminate the grievant's rehabilitation
program.

He did so himself, by continuing to abuse cocaine throughout,

and by his lack of diligence at Holyoke Hospital leading to his expulsion.
I find nothing in the Policy or in the contract which requires the Company
to extend the grievant's period of treatment after the grievant himself
defaulted on the opportunity of rehabilitation; nor was the Company's
refusal to do so unreasonable.

Any other ruling would sanction repeated

failures and lack of diligence in rehabilitation, with apparent impunity.

I do not read the Policy to require the Company to permit an
employee to return to work before testing him a second time.

Indeed

Section 25 of the Policy expressly states that:
"An employee...may be returned (to duty) only after
the Company physician determines (their) fitness for
duty."
Manifestly, to my mind, an employee removed from duty because of
drug abuse cannot be deemed fit for duty thereafter unless tested to show
he is free of drug use.

So a subsequent test is an inherent requirement

for determination of fitness and at the threshold of a return to work.
That the Company did not allow the grievant to return to work before
testing him again, was not unreasonable.
Similarly, I find nothing
ompany to give the grievant
specific date, drug free.
requirement of the policy.
clear.

in the Policy that required the

an "ultimatum"

to return to work by a

Such an ultimatum is implicit in the express
The meaning of Section 26 (a,b, and c) is

Employees given the chance to undertake treatment are on notice

that they must comply with the terms of that treatment; that disciplinary
action may

be imposed during the period of treatment; and that any

subsequent positive test will result in discharge.

In short, the entire

jeriod of treatment and the requirements of compliance are, unmistakably,
ultimata" themselves.

So, I cannot find it unreasonable that the company

did not give the grievant a further, explicit ultimatum, before another
test was given, and before discipline, expressly reserved as a right of
action in Section 26 (b), was imposed.
As to the test of June 2nd, I find it immaterial whether the
positive result was merely a residue of the grievant's admitted use of
cocaine on May 24th or evidence of his continued use between May 24th and

une 2nd. The Union asserts that because the test result whether taken on
4ay 31st or June 2nd was "pre-ordained" to be positive, to administer it
on either day, was unreasonable.

That view begs the real question.

The

eal question is whether the Company had the right to call the grievant in
or a test some forty-two days after he first tested positive.
ind it unreasonable for the Company to have done so.

I cannot

Section 26 (a)

speaks of a medical leave of absence for a "minimum of 14 days."
grievant's leave was three times that
continued

to

abuse

cocaine

rehabilitation program.

and

during

length, and throughout
it he

was

expelled

The Policy clearly contemplates

The

it he
from a

a subsequent

urine test sometime after 14 days. Considering the grievant's poor record
during his leave of absence I cannot judge it to be unreasonable for the
company to call the grievant in for testing and to test him anytime after
the 14 days, and certainly not after 42 days.
The critical fact is that on June 2nd he again tested positive
in violation of the Policy that "any subsequent positive test will result
in discharge"

(emphasis added).

The Policy is unequivocal.

It refers

to any subsequent test, and mandates the penalty of discharge.

So,

whether the June 2nd positive result was due to use of cocaine on May 24th
and/or thereafter, is immaterial.

It still is a subsequent positive test.

Additionally, with the right of the Company to order such a test forty-two
days after the first test, it is equally immaterial that the results were
•pre-destined" to be positive.

The Company had given the grievant an

ample and reasonable opportunity to rehabilitate himself over a forty-two
day period.

Considering his lack of diligence and responsibility in

undertaking that opportunity,

the Company had the right on May 31st, or

June 2nd to bring it to an end and to administer a subsequent test, even
if the results of that subsequent test were a foregone conclusion.

Finally, I, and apparently the experts agree, that in-patient
care

throughout

treatment.

a period

of

rehabilitation

is the

best

method of

The Union seems to argue that the Company had a duty to

rovide the best treatment to the grievant, and not having done so, the
disciplinary penalty should be nullified.

Neither the Policy nor the

contract requires that of the Company. The medical treatment afforded the
grievant was the best available under his and the Company's medical
insurance.
appears

There is no evidence that it was a poor program.

to have been customary

and adequately respected.

Indeed, it
Assuming

arguendo that a total in-patient program is the best therapy, it is mere
speculation at best, to think that the grievant would have responded any
better to it than to what was available and afforded to him.
It is my hope that the grievant's claimed successful treatment
after his discharge will be permanently
achieved rehabilitation.

effective and that he has finally

The Arbitrator has no authority to restore him

to duty because he now may be well.

It was his condition at the time of

his discharge that is determinative.

But if he has now overcome his

addiction, it is hoped he can gain employment elsewhere and pursue a
useful and healthy life.
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The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator in the above
matter, and having duly heard the proof and allegations of the above-named
>arties, makes the following Award:
The Company had proper cause to
terminate the employment of James Phelan
on or about June 7, 1994.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED:

January 16, 1995

STATE OF NEW YORK

)
ss:

COUNTY OF NEW YORK )
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrator
that I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument,
is my AWARD.
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AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
OPEIU, Local 153, AFL-CIO

OPINION AND AWARD
Case No. 13 300 00266 94

and
Long Island University
The stipulated issue is:
Was there just cause for the termination
of Calvin Ratteray? If not, what shall be
the remedy?
Hearings were held on March 7 and June 1, 1995 at which time
Mr. Ratteray, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and representatives of the above-named Union and University appeared.

All

concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The Arbi-

trator's Oath was waived.
The grievant was discharged for his "involvement and conduct
in an altercation on the University's property on December 21,
1993."

More specifically he is charged with "stalking" and then in

the course of an argument, "slapping" the face of a female pharmacy
student.
Prior to his dismissal on December 23, 1993 the grievant was
a laboratory technician-specialist at the University's College of
Pharmacy.

As such, he was a salaried employee of the University,

-2-

and had been so employed for over 24 years.
It is the University's position that regardless of the relationship between the grievant and the female student (Marcel Forsythe)
and irrespective of the circumstances, for a University employee to
strike a student is intolerable and manifestly grounds for discharge, regardless of the length of his employment or unblemished
prior record.
The grievant, and the Union on his behalf deny the charge.
They assert that the grievant and Forsythe had a romantic and intimate relationship; that the confrontation in a University building on Decmber 21, 1993 was merely a verbal exchange; that there
were no witnesses; and that Forsythe falsified the alleged assault
to University security and its Director of Personnel.
Let me be blunt and come right to the point.

I do not think

that either the grievant or Forsythe testified truthfully.
reject the grievant's denial of the assault.

I

His claim that

Forsythe's glasses flew off her face because she shook her head
vigorously during their verbal encounter, is simply not probable or
plausible. Rather, I conclude the glasses flew off when the
grievant struck her. Her spontaneous statement, to those who heard
her cryout, to Security shortly after the incident, and the report
she made to Personnel and the nurse and the independent testimony
of her reddened cheek, all support this conclusion.

-3-

On the other hand, I do not believe her when she denied that
she and the grievant had a romantic and intimate relationship.

Her

admission that she "slept over" at the grievant's house "once or
twice;" the photographs introduced into evidence showing them
together (apparently happily and playfully) at a restaurant and at
leisure,; and her admission that she "confided" in him, persuade me
of that relationship.
What happened here, I believe, is that the romantic relationship went sour; that she decided to end it; that he resisted and
spent a night in the hallways of a dormitory where she was located
studying for an exam with some other student, trying to find her;
and when they did meet, after he was unable to find her or unable
to persuade her to come out of her study sessions, they had a
quarrel and he slapped her face. There is no evidence of any prior
acts of violence by the grievant nor is there evidence of a
propensity for violence.

I believe this was a single incident.

Nonetheless I agree with the University that absent
mitigating circumstances, an employee who strikes a student commits
an indefensible offense that warrants dismissal.
Here, however I find two particular circumstances in the
nature of mitigation which cause me to impose a severe disciplinary penalty on the grievant, but short of discharge.
Those circumstances, unwittingly of course, but none the less

-4-

consequential, afix some responsibility on the University for the
critical event.
The first is the University's failure to remove the grievant
from the University dormitory the night and morning of December
20th and 21st.

The record before me shows that persons not housed

in the dormitory or not there for educational purposes, are not
permitted to remain in the building after midnight.

The grievant

entered the dormitory at 10:15 PM and did not leave until after
2:30 AM. As he logged in his presence was known to the security
personnel on duty.

During those more than four hours the grievant

looked for Forsythe, openly telephoned the rooms of students where
he believed she was studying, and even asked students of her
whereabouts.

The anger from the apparent rupture of their relation-

ship and her obvious avoidance of him (she acknowledged she knew he
was in the dormitory looking for her), and the frustration at being
unable to find her must have mounted, leading to the outburst later
the same day.

Had Security maintained surveillance over his

activities that night and removed him after midnight, and had his
unorthodox conduct (as a University employee) been reported as it
occurred, the uninterrupted emotional factors leading to the
assault may have been defused.
Also, as there is nothing in the record about any University
rule or policy regarding romantic or intimate relationships between

-5-

University employees and students I can only presume that there
was no rule or policy on that subject. That being so, the
University knew or should have known that adult relationships could
and indeed would develop between employees and students.

The

absence of any restrictive rule or policy means that the University
tolerated such relationships. Toleration carries with it knowledge
or constructive knowledge that those relationships could turn sour,
could lead to quarrels, and could involve, in extreme but not
unprecedented instances, possible violence.
This is not to say that the University should have
promulgated a rule prohibiting romantic or intimate relationships
between employees and students.

(Though I personally favor such a

rule and legislated one at the Hofstra Law School), but rather that
not having done so, the University cannot be fully absolved from
some responsibility for the consequences of a broken relationship,
including, as here, an act of violence.
In short, adopting the tort theory of "contributory
negligence," I afix some constructive blame on the University for
the unfortunate events of this case.
been

more rigidly

Its employees should have

instructed and supervised for obvious

protective reasons.
This does not excuse the grievant.

Regardless of his

relationship with Forsythe there was absolutely no justification,

-6-

socially or legally, for him to slap her. His misconduct warrants
a severe penalty.

Only because of the University's omissions in

this matter will I reduce his discharge to a disciplinary
suspension.i The grievant has been out of the University's employ
for about 18 months.
of 24 months.

I shall extend that period of time to a total

Accordingly, the grievant shall be reinstated on

December 23, 1995 without any back pay. The period of time from
his discharge on December 23, 1993 to his reinstatement on December
23, 1995 shall be deemed a disciplinary suspension.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator in the
above matter and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of
the above-named parties, makes the following AWARD
The discharge of Calvin Ratteray
is reduced to a disciplinary suspension. He shall be reinstated
without back pay on December 23,
1995.

DATED: JULY 10, 1995
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )ss:

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

iForsythe's rights in other forums, such as a possible court
action for assault, are not within my jurisdiction and are not
determined by this decision.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,
ADMINISTRATOR
-X

In the Matter of the Arbitration
i.
between
OPINION AND AWARD
LOCAL 707, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD
OF TEAMSTERS

Case #13 300 0044595

-andMAGAZINE DISTRIBUTORS, INC.

The stipulated issue is:
Was there just cause for the discharge of ANTHONY
COSTA?

If not, what shall be the remedy?

A hearing was held on August 22, 1995 at which time Mr. Costa,
hereinafter

referred

to as the "grievant" and representatives

above-named Union and Company appeared.
opportunity

of the

All concerned were afforded full

to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-

examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

Prior to his discharge the grievant was a driver, delivering on
behalf

of the

Company boxed

and bundled magazines to various retail

dealers.
The

charges

against him, for which he was

discharged, are

"theft" and "falsification of Company documents."
More specifically he is charged with falsifying the reason for
the return of boxes of magazines to the Company, and, attendant thereto,
with the pilferage of significant numbers of certain magazines from those
boxes and their
concludes

that

conversion to his own use.
the

magazines

he removed

The Company alleges and

from the

boxes he used for

personal transactions to the retail dealers or otherwise, and that that
constituted "theft." His return of those boxes, claiming that the dealers
refused or failed to accept them because of an inability to pay, was a
"falsification."
Additionally, as to "bundles" of magazine or "loose titles," the
Company asserts that shortages found after return from his delivery run
were also pilfered by him and converted to his own improper use.
The case against the grievant is circumstantial.

He was not

seen removing magazines from the inventory on his truck, nor is there any
direct evidence of any improper transactions with dealers or others. None
of the outlets who were to receive the boxes of magazines which the
grievant returned to the Company with the report of "refused, nonpayment"
testified or offered any evidence.
I agree with the Union that because the charge, in significant
part at least ("theft") parallels a crime, the standard of proof required
of the Company should be rigidly adhered to.

But, I conclude that that

requisite arbitral standard of proof has been met.
One can legitimately debate whether the grievant's culpability
has been shown under the criminal standard of "beyond a reasonable doubt."
But it is not the criminal standard that is applicable in discipline
cases, including cases of discharge for offenses that parallel crimes.
The evidentiary standard, as both sides recognize, is proof that is "clear
and convincing."
Though the evidence against the grievant is circumstantial, I am
satisfied that even a rigid application of the "clear and convincing"
standard to the facts and proofs, establishes this grievant's culpability
for the offenses charged.

Critical

to the case against the grievant is the evidence

regarding two boxes of magazines, destined respectively for the outlets
Highway Cigar and News Galaxy.
Suspicious
"tip"

about the grievant's practices after receiving a

on an earlier

day that

a driver was

selling or distributing

magazines from his truck on the street, and after determining, based on
time and location, that it was the grievant, the Company ordered that his
inventory of magazines be checked on March 8, 1995 upon completion of his
route, to compare the quantity he started with and the quantity delivered,
with the quantity that remained.
It is the unrefuted testimony of the Company that from the two
boxes destined

for Highway Cigar and News Galaxy but returned to the

Company by the grievant because of "no payment," there was an unaccounted
for shortage of a significant number of popular magazines; that the straps
on the boxes were loose; that the boxes were partially crushed (with an
attendant loosening of the straps) ; that the side panels of the boxes were
or appeared to have been sliced (making, based on simulation, the removal
of magazines from that opening possible); and that to compensate for the
magazines removed, the boxes were stuffed with newspapers and a camel
cigarette catalog.
Also unrefuted
filled by conveyor

is the Company testimony that the boxes are

belt by other

employees; that for the particular

delivery scheduled for March 8th, the boxes were packed and secured with
plastic straps on March 6th.

And placed on the grievant's truck on March

7th, following which the truck was locked and remained locked (with the
key in the possession only of the foreman) until the grievant was ready to
begin his delivery run on March 8th.

Finally,

again unrefuted,

the Company's

Operations Manager

testified that following the inventory showing the shortages in the boxes
returned by the grievant, he visited the two dealers involved — Highway
Cigar and News Galaxy, and saw on their magazine racks a quantity of the
very titles that the grievant returned and which the grievant claimed
those dealers rejected.
From these observations, the Company concluded that the titles
displayed by those two outlets were the magazines missing from the boxes
the grievant returned; that the grievant must have engaged in a private
transaction to supply those dealers with the magazines he "stole"; and
that the return of the boxes because the dealers would not or could not
pay for them, was a manifest falsification.
As I see it, there are only three principal and reviewable
possibilities to account for the missing magazines.
First

is

the

possibility

that

the

Company witnesses

are

falsifying what they did and learned when they checked the grievant's
inventory.
magnitude.

That, of course, would contribute a "frame-up" of an immense
I reject this possibility.

There is no evidence that the

Company or any of its officials had reason to falsify their testimony or
capriciously planned to falsely charge the grievant with or implicate him
in a "theft."

Indeed, the Company had prior problems with the grievant in

connection with unexplained shortages, and had warned him. Those warnings
were not protested or grieved as unfounded or false.
The second possibility is that the boxes were filled improperly
or "short" by the personnel at the conveyor location, a day before they
were put on the grievant's truck.

And that the newspaper and catalog

filler were added to the boxes then to cover-up the removal of the
magazines.

Or that the magazines were removed from the boxes, and paper

and catalog filler substituted sometime between the time that the boxes
were loaded in the grievant's truck and the day he went on his delivery
route.
I reject these possibilities as illogical and unrealistic.

If

other personnel were pilfering magazines when the boxes were filled, or en
route to the truck, or after being loaded on the truck, shortages would
have been found in boxes that were delivered to dealers.

Those dealers,

upon opening their boxes would have found shortages from what they ordered
and would have found newspaper and catalog fillers.

And they certainly

would have complained to the Company and demanded credit or reimbursement
for what they did not receive.
shortages.

There is no evidence of any such other

For the shortages to be limited to and identified only with

the boxes the grievant returned would have required careful coordination
between the grievant and those other employees.

The boxes would have had

to be selectively chosen and the grievant would have had to know which
boxes he was to return as rejected by the dealers.

And the same would be

required if the boxes were tampered with en route to or while locked in
the grievant's truck.

I am not persuaded of the feasibility or realistic

possibility of either scenario.

Moreover, any such set of circumstances

necessarily involving the willful participation of the grievant. It would
make him an active part of a theft and falsification and obviously could
not be a defense to the instant charges.
What remains are the allegations advanced by the Company in this
case.

The

circumstances

grievant's culpability.
have been opened.

add up logically and realistically

to the

The evidence shows that the boxes appeared to

The sides were slit or apparently slit.

corners made it easy to slide the straps off or aside.

The crushed

Significantly, the

newspapers in the boxes were dated not March 6th when the boxes were

filled and not March 7th when placed in the grievant's truck, but rather
March 8th, the day of the scheduled delivery, the day the boxes were
returned and the day the magazine shortages were found.

There is no

evidence that newspapers dated March 8th could have been available earlier
than the early morning of March 8th.
I conclude, therefore, that the newspapers were put in the boxes
on March 8th and that only the grievant could have done so.
That the titles missing from the boxes, in the approximate
quantity

missing

approximation

(at least as to the

one

outlet

where

a quantity

was made by the Operations Manager) were on display at

outlets the grievant claims refused delivery, adds evidence to the facts
and circumstances that can only be explained logically and reasonably by
the grievant's culpability.

Because it is otherwise purely speculative,

I accept as accurate the Company testimony that no other unauthorized
distributors could have delivered that quantity to those outlets on March
8th, and that the quantity precluded "swapping" or borrowing from other
outlets.
Also,

because

I accept

as truthful

the

testimony

of the

Company's Operations Manager and the then Driver Check-in Foreman, I do
not find the Company's case prejudiced by its inability to produce at the
hearing

the particular newspapers found

testimony by Highway Cigar or Galaxy.
circumstances, the

in the boxes or to produce

Indeed, under my findings and the

fruitlessness of any effort to do the

latter is

obvious.
With

the

foregoing

it

is

unnecessary

for

me

to

deal

substantively with the shortages in the "bundles" handled by the grievant
or in his

"A Station"

inventory.

Procedurally, however, I find no

precedential import to the undisputed fact that for shortages in that or

those

products,

drivers

have not

required to pay for the shortages.

been disciplined, but rather

only

Here, the major charge against the

grievant is not shortages in his A Station inventory

or in loose or

bundled magazines, but rather pilferage in significant quantities from
boxes and conversion to an improper use and falsification of documents.
There is no past practice or precedent limiting the Company's disciplinary
action

for those

offenses

to

simply

payment by the driver for the

shortages.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator in the above
matter, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the abovenamed parties, makes the following AWARD:
The discharge of ANTHONY COSTA was for just cause.

Eric J/Schmertz, Arbitrator/
DATED:

September 1, 1995

STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)
ss:
)

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Impartial
Chairman that I am the individual described in and who executed this
instrument, which is my AWARD.

